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Abstract 
This dissertation, comprised of three essays, explains and evaluates local government structural 
changes from a public finance perspective. The first essay examines the determinants of the rapid 
growth of special districts, while the next two essays estimate the effects on property values of 
school district consolidation and village dissolution in New York State, respectively. Together, 
the three essays contribute to our understanding of the causes and consequences of local 
government structural changes in the United States. 
By bring together two central trends in state and local public finance, namely, the expansion of 
state-imposed tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) and the rapid growth of special districts, 
the first essay looks into the hypothesis that TELs are partly responsible for the increase of 
special districts over the last several decades. To eliminate the possible omitted variable bias, I 
employ a combination of fixed effects, regional time trends and approximate measures of fiscal 
conservativeness. Based on a national data set of counties over the period 1972-2007, I find 
TELs, on average, increase the use of special districts (circumvention effects), whereas TELs 
don’t force local governments to cut their intergovernmental fiscal transfer to special districts in 
the same county area (deterrent effects). The estimation results are robust to multiple tests of 
common trends assumptions, five alternative measures of TELs, alternative model specifications 
and different empirical strategies. This results confirm the theory that special districts have been 
extensively created by local general-purpose governments as an institutional strategy to 
circumvent the fiscal constraints imposed by TELs.  
The second essay explores the impacts of school district consolidation on property values in 
upstate New York from 2000 to 2012. This research, conducted in collaboration with Professors 
William Duncombe and John Yinger, adds a time dimension to research on the property-value 
impacts of consolidation. By combining propensity score matching and double-sales data to 
compare house value changes in consolidating and comparable school districts, we find that it 
takes time either for the advantages of consolidation to be apparent to homebuyers or for the 
people who prefer consolidated districts to move in. In addition, the long-run impacts of 
consolidation on house values are positive in low-income census tracts but negative in high-
income census tracts. This result suggests that high-income households are particularly attached 
to the benefits, such as close contact with teachers, of small districts.  
Streams of institutional, economic and fiscal factors recently have been converging and 
substantially changing the landscape of local government in the United States. Dissolution, an 
old and new approach, has increasingly been used and therefore drawn much public attention 
nowadays. The third essay provides the first study investigating whether village dissolution, as a 
form of general-purpose government reorganization, affects the attractiveness of local 
communities. In New York, voters in several villages voted to dissolve the village and hence to 
shift all government services to the town government in which the village is located. I show that 
village dissolution does not alter the amount people are willing to pay inside the (eliminated) 
village boundaries, but that the price of housing declines in areas of the town outside the village 
(TOV). Presumably, residents in the TOV areas are upset with the negative externalities of 
village dissolution.  
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Introduction 
American fiscal federalism has dramatically changed at local level, and the change is 
clearly reflected through three stylized facts. First, the number of special districts has increased 
more than 100 percent over the last several decades, and the combined expenditures of single-
function jurisdictions, which include 35,000 special districts and 13,500 school districts, 
exceeded the combined expenditures of all municipalities (Berry, 2009). Second, the number of 
school districts has been cut by almost 90 percent over the past century (National Center for 
Education Statistics (NCES) 2006, 2011), and many states still contain several school districts 
with enrollment below 500 pupils, which are good candidates for consolidation. Third, more than 
50 villages have studied the feasibility of dissolution in New York State and 12 of them 
succeeded in voting for dissolution. 
When a new government emerges or an existing government ceases, local residents’ tax 
burden will be directly influenced. The quantity and quality of public services will also be 
affected. The extent to which local residents’ interests could be well represented, local identity, 
the bargaining power of residents, and the link between public services and their payments will 
accordingly change as well. These factors are associated with two key concerns in fiscal 
federalism studies, one is the trade-off between allocative efficiency and productive efficiency, 
and the other is political accountability. Take school district consolidation as an example. The 
principal justification for consolidation is economies of scale; however, as shown in the literature 
and also in my dissertation, allocative efficiency may be sacrificed for high-income parents, as 
they put much more value on parental access to teachers in small school districts. Another 
example is special districts, which have extensively issued debt and borrowed money in a 
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“backdoor” approach, putting into question the political accountability of special districts (New 
York State Office of the State Comptroller, 2005).   
Thus, a fundamental research task is to identify the real determinants and to assess the 
effects of those local government structural changes. Based on the three above-mentioned 
stylized facts, this dissertation seeks to examine the cause and consequence of those changes 
from a public finance perspective. Basically, the first essay investigates whether TELs 
incentivize local governments to create more special districts to provide public services. The 
other two essays, based on property sales data, use the change of property values to assess the 
overall impact of school district consolidation and village dissolution, respectively. The logic 
behind this capitalization approach is property values comprehensively, although indirectly, 
capture the impact of any improvements affected by government reorganization. It is noteworthy 
that the focus of these two studies is not to estimate the impact of government reorganization on 
people’s average willingness to pay. Instead, the purpose is simply to look for a sign whether 
people care about government reorganization and how much home buyers value those 
government reorganizations. So, in this narrow sense, using capitalization approach to assess the 
overall impact of government reorganization is reasonably appealing. 
The rapid increase of special districts and the quick expansion of state-imposed TELs are 
the two central trends in state and local public finance since the 1970s. However, there is a big 
legal loophole in the TEL laws, namely, special districts are commonly exempted from TELs. 
The temporal coincidence of those two trends and the existence of the loophole lead to a testable 
hypothesis whether TELs could partly explain the rapid growth of special districts. The existing 
literature, however, fails to achieve a consensus on this topic. To fill the gap, I adopt four TEL 
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indicators and a TEL index to measure the fiscal stringency of TELs. In addition, because every 
state or region has a distinctive political and fiscal culture, and because fiscal conservativeness 
may simultaneously affect the adoption of TELs and local governments’ fiscal behaviors 
(Rueben, 1997), I employ a combination of fixed effects, regional time trends, and two 
approximate measures of fiscal conservativeness to minimize the potential bias in the estimate of 
the impact of TELs on the number of special districts. To avoid the possibility that the results are 
driven by other time-varying factors, I add a vector of state-specific linear time trends to the 
model but find no substantial change of the coefficient of TELs. I also examine the use of special 
districts not only after the adoption of TELs but also before the adoption of TEL laws. 
Significant changes in special districts are not found in the years before the adoption of TELs, 
either. These two tests justify the common trend assumption and warrant the validity of the main 
model. The final estimation results demonstrate that TELs significantly stimulate local 
governments to create more special districts. In other words, the results lends solid support to 
politics of circumvention theory, suggesting that local governments seek to circumvent fiscal 
constraints caused by TELs through creating more special districts to finance public services. In 
addition, combining the empirical findings in my dissertation with those in existing studies, we 
should be aware that the “entrepreneurship” of local government may help to strike a balance 
between the demand for public services and the political and fiscal pressure from the public, on 
the one hand; it may complicate the local governance system and blur, or even increase the true 
cost of public services, on the other hand. 
Seven school districts were consolidated into three between 2000 and 2012 in New York 
State. Based on a sample of repeat sales, the second essay, which is conducted in collaboration 
with Professors Duncombe and Yinger, responds to two questions. First, what is the impact of 
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school district consolidation on property values? Second, are there heterogeneities in property 
value impacts of consolidation across different income groups and pre-consolidation enrollment 
size? Considering that the impact of consolidation may depend on many observable school 
districts characteristics and house traits, we use Propensity Score Matching to reduce covariate 
bias between the treated and control groups. Then, we use traditional regression methods with 
difference-in-difference (D-D) design to adjust for residual bias caused by unobserved variables 
and to increase estimation efficiency. Basically, we find, except in one relatively large district in 
the Albany area, consolidation has a negative impact on house values during the years right after 
it occurs and that this effect then fades away and is eventually reversed. This pattern suggests 
that it takes time either for the advantages of consolidation to be apparent or for the people who 
prefer consolidated districts to move in. In addition, we find the long-run impacts of 
consolidation on house values are positive in census tracts that initially have low incomes, but 
negative in high-income census tracts, where parents may have a relatively large willingness to 
retain the non-budgetary advantages of small districts. We also estimate models that include 
interactions with both the dummy for the large school district and initial census-tract income. As 
the large school district has a relatively high income, however, we were unable to separate the 
impact on this pattern of initial district enrollment and of initial neighborhood income. These are 
topics for future research. Finally, since relatively few districts in New York consolidate, 
districts that do consolidate are not likely to be typical and representative of all other big or small 
districts in the state. Thus, this study should be regarded as a case study about the impact on 
house values of three specific consolidations, not as a study about the impact of consolidation in 
general.  
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The last chapter targets on village dissolution. Currently, village governments are 
confronted with a variety of political, economic, and fiscal challenges in New York State, 
including the outdated municipal class designation, contentious inter-governmental fiscal 
relationships, increasing budget constraints, and the fragmented property tax assessing system. 
Consequently, dissolution has been widely adopted by village residents as a way to reduce fiscal 
burden and eliminate duplicative services. New York State government has even provided a 
Local Government Efficiency Grant to facilitate village dissolution. So, the first question I ask in 
Chapter 3 is whether village dissolutions affect property values in former village areas. Most 
villages are located in a town area and the town government will automatically be responsible for 
providing public services after the village is dissolved. That means, town residents may have to 
face negative/possible externalities resulting from village dissolution, as their public service 
quality and cost could be subsequently changed. Town residents, however, are excluded from the 
decision-making process of village dissolution. This unique institutional arrangement raises 
another interesting question: do village dissolutions affect property values in town outside village 
(TOV) areas? The lack of sufficient, straddling, and representative property sales make it 
impossible for me to employ a combination of propensity score matching and difference-in-
difference regression, as I do in Chapter 2. However, a sample of repeat sales still allows me to 
get unbiased estimation results when controlling for parcel-level fixed effects and village-
specific time trends and excluding non-comparable observations from dissimilar geographical 
regions. Basically, I find dissolution events do not bother property values in former village areas, 
presumably special districts are designed to replace former village governments in providing 
basic public services. In the future, more information is needed about special districts and the 
change of public service cost in village areas to confirm and enrich my empirical findings. 
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Dissolution events, however, do decrease property values in TOV areas, owing to unavoidable 
cost shifts and possibly other negative spillover effects to TOV areas. 
Overall, my dissertation sheds light on the fiscal determinants of special districts and 
provides a comprehensive, though indirect, evaluation of village dissolution and school district 
consolidation. It also makes direct and indirect contributions to perennial debates on local 
government size, revenue and expenditure assignments, and intergovernmental fiscal relations in 
a federal system. 
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Chapter 1: 
The Unintended Impact of Tax and Expenditure Limitations on the Use of Special 
Districts: The Politics of Circumvention 
1.1. Introduction 
The past half century in the United States has witnessed a dramatic change in local 
governance and local fiscal resource distribution. Specifically, state and local governments are 
increasingly choosing to spin-off special districts to finance and provide public services 
(Bourdeaux, 2005). According to the Census Bureau, the number of special districts has 
increased more than 100 percent from 18,323 in 1962 to 37,203 in 20121; and, the combined 
expenditures of single-function jurisdictions, which include special districts and school districts, 
exceeded the combined expenditures of all municipalities (Berry, 2009). Special districts have a 
variety of government functions, including financing public infrastructure2, natural resources, 
utilities, sewage, water supply, housing, and soil conservation among others, most of which are 
crucially important to maintaining the quality of local public service and the attractiveness of the 
local business investment environment.  For example, every county in New York State has a 
state-designated “Industrial Development Agency” (IDA) that issues non-guaranteed debt, 
typically for economic development purposes.  
                                                          
1  School districts are not special districts, although they are also defined as one type of special-purpose governments. The historical 
change in the number of school districts in the U.S. mainly reflects economies of scale and other considerations, which are 
fundamentally different from the rationale behind the growth of special districts. So, following the traditional definition in the 
Census of Government Dataset, the analysis in this paper excludes school districts. 
2  It is a common misconception that special districts exist primarily to finance the construction of infrastructure and public works. 
As clearly shown in Berry (2009, P35, Table 2.3), most special districts are direct or indirect service providers. 
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Although special districts are important in providing public services, stimulating 
community development, and enhancing allocative efficiency3, they are denounced as a source of 
diseconomies of scale and wasteful duplication of services (ACIR, 1964). In addition to these 
problems discussed in the literature on the horizontal dimension of fiscal federalism, recent 
studies on the vertical dimension of fiscal federalism suggest that the vertical layering of 
fragmented special districts causes aggregate public budgets to be larger than when the same 
services are provided by a single general-purpose government. Stated differently, they find that 
concurrent taxation causes significant increases in local taxes and spending, as predicted by the 
fiscal common-pool theory (Berry, 2009).  
Special districts, often labeled “shadow governments” or “ad-hoc governments,” are also 
found to be politically invisible. Particularly, the governing boards of many special districts are 
either elected with extremely low turnout rates or appointed by local parent government officers. 
Although there is no national data on the turnout rate in all special districts’ elections, scattered 
data suggests that the turnout rates in special districts are extremely low in Nassau County in 
New York, California, Michigan, and Cook County in Illinois (Suozzi, 2007; Weimer, 2001; 
Little Hoover Commission, 2000; Berry, 2009). In addition, the timing of elections for special 
districts are often not the same day as general elections, increasing the participation cost and 
significantly discouraging voters who are least concerned with the special districts’ policy issues 
(Dunne et al., 1997; and Berry, 2009). The political invisibility of special districts leads to the 
concern that they mainly serve particular interest groups and/or appointing authorities and calls 
                                                          
3  As argued by scholars of public choice schools and proponents of “polycentricity” (Tullock, 1969; Ostrom et al., 1988), special 
districts are likely to increase inter-jurisdictional competition. 
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their political and fiscal accountability into question (Bollens, 1957; Axelrod, 1992; Foster, 
1997; and Radford, 2013). 
Given that special districts raise a series of concerns on the efficiency and accountability 
of the fragmented local governance system in the U.S., it is important to investigate what 
accounts for the growth of special districts over the past several decades. One of the largest 
bodies of scholarship on special districts explores their association with state-imposed TELs 
precisely because of the following facts: (1) special districts are commonly exempted from Tax 
and Expenditure Limitations (TELs), which are imposed by a state government on its local 
governments, and (2) both special districts and TELs have expanded rapidly since the 1970s. 
Theoretically, TELs could either negatively or positively affect the use of special districts. On 
the one hand, TELs perhaps undermine the fiscal capacity of local governments, who may in 
turn, as a way to address the imposed fiscal pressure, cut their fiscal aid to cooperated special 
districts in corresponding jurisdictions. In other words, local general-purpose governments could 
pass the fiscal constraints imposed by TELs over to special districts, preventing the growth of 
special districts (i.e., deterrent effect). On the other hand, local general-purpose governments4 
may use special districts as an institutional strategy to circumvent the fiscal constraints of state-
imposed TELs, leading to a positive relationship (i.e., circumvention effect). The existing 
literature, however, fails to conceptually differentiate the two channels and empirically achieve a 
consensus on the estimation sign and the magnitude of the effects that TELs have on special 
districts.  
                                                          
4  Local general-purpose governments and local governments are interchangeably used in this paper. 
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To fill the gap in the literature, I built a longitudinal government dataset at the county 
level from 1972 to 2007, and I exploit a wide degree in variation of TEL laws and the number of 
special districts across states and counties. I adopt four TEL indicators and a TEL index to 
measure the fiscal stringency of TELs and employ a combination of fixed effects, regional time 
trends, and approximate measures of fiscal conservativeness to eliminate the bias in the estimate 
of the impact of TELs on special districts. The empirical results lend strong support to 
circumvention effects and refute the possible deterrent effects. Specifically, I find TELs, on 
average, increase the use of special districts, whereas TELs don’t force local governments to cut 
their intergovernmental fiscal transfer to special districts in the same county area. The estimation 
results are robust to alternative model specifications and empirical strategies. 
In a broad view, the empirical findings indicate that creating new special districts, as a 
circumvention tool, is comparatively appealing relative to traditional options. Stated differently, 
when facing fiscal pressures caused by TELs, local government not only use traditional 
approaches such as outsourcing, cutting expenditures, diversifying revenue sources, etc, but they 
also turn to off-budgetary approaches such as building special districts to “invisibly” finance 
public services. Given that the primary motivation of TELs is to reduce tax and increase the 
efficiency of government operation, the unintended proliferation of off-budgetary special 
districts represents a backlash, as the extensive use of fragmented special districts would 
probably undermine the local accountability and complicate, even increase, the true cost of local 
public services. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section Two briefly describes historical trends of 
special districts in the existing literature. Next, in Sections Three to Five, I introduce the 
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theoretical framework, sample building, and empirical strategies. Empirical results and 
explanations will be presented in Section Six. Section Seven checks the sensitivity of my results, 
followed by conclusions and discussions on the limitations of the study.  
1.2. The Growth of Special Districts and Literature Review 
According to the definition by the Census of Governments, special districts are 
independent special-purpose government units, which “exist as separate entities with substantial 
administrative and fiscal independence from general-purpose local governments.” Specifically, 
fiscal independence implies that an entity can determine its budget, set tax rates, collect fees and 
charges, and issue debt without review by other local governments; whereas administrative 
independence indicates that an entity “has a popularly elected governing body representing two 
or more local governments or even in the event its governing body is appointed, it performs 
functions that are essentially different from those of, and are not subject to specification by, its 
creating government.”5 Thus, some local government agencies with considerable fiscal 
autonomy are not considered to be governments, but are classified as dependent agencies of 
another government if they are controlled by a board composed wholly or mainly of parent 
government officials, or fiscally, their revenue largely depends on appropriations or allocations 
at the discretion of another state, county, municipality, township, school district or special 
district.6 In addition to the administrative and fiscal independence, special districts are also 
                                                          
5  More information about the definition of special districts can be found in Individual State Descriptions: 2012, issued by the 
Census Bureau. 
6  It is noteworthy that homeowners’ associations (HOAs) and other types of institutions, which are often labeled as “private 
government,” are not special districts, either. According to Helsley and Strange (1998), private governments have five distinctive 
essential characteristics: they are voluntary, exclusive, supplementary, self-financing, and strategic. Their analysis indicates that 
private government causes the public sector to reduce its provisions of the collective good, and the welfare effects of private 
government are ambiguous and complex. Cheung (2008) finds that TELs stimulated the growth of HOAs in the era of Proposition 
13 in California, but his empirical results cannot be simply applied to the case in this paper due to the fundamental difference 
between special districts and private governments.  
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characterized by being exempt from civil service regulations, rules for competitive bidding and 
procurement, local building codes, and some fiscal constraints (Walsh, 1978). 
Compared with the stable trend of all types of local general-purpose governments and the 
declining trend in the number of school districts in the past one hundred years, it is well-known 
that special districts have grown rapidly in the U.S., as shown in Figure 1. Special districts could 
be classified and understood in many ways. One approach is to divide them into two categories 
by the number of functions they assume, including single-function districts and multiple-function 
ones. Figure 2 (below) indicates that single-function, multiple-function, and the total number of 
special districts increased from 1972 to 2007 by 44%, 372%, and 56.5%, respectively. Another 
approach among scholars to differentiate special districts is to divide them into two types of 
independent local institutions: one type is taxing districts (TD), which are governed by elected 
boards and have the power to tax, and the other type are public authorities (PA), which are 
governed by appointed boards and have no taxing power (Foster, 1997).7A third approach 
differentiates all special districts into 37 categories by their specific functions, including fire 
protection, school building authority, mortgage credit, libraries, irrigation, drainage, water supply 
utilities, and the like.  
State enabling legislation fundamentally provides the legal basis for the creation of 
special districts at the local level. State general-enabling legislation sets forth the rules for all 
districts of a particular type in a state, while state special-enabling legislation pertains to a single 
special district. Although a few special districts are established through special-enabling 
legislation, most special districts are mainly created through two common ways pursuant to state 
                                                          
7 An example of public authorities is the Recreation Authorities in Georgia. More details about it can be found at  
http://www2.census.gov/govs/cog/gc0212ga.pdf  
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general-enabling legislation. First, one or more local general-purpose governments may create a 
special district by resolution; second, a citizen or group of citizens may initiate taxing districts by 
petition (Foster, 1997). In a nutshell, the state statutes basically govern the number of types or 
the functional breadth of local special districts, which in turn determines the real number of 
special districts. 
The existing literature on special districts has extensively discussed the following 
research questions. First, what are the determinants of the increase of special districts (Foster, 
1997)? Second, does the decentralized public service provision via more special districts affect 
residential property values (Billings and Thibodeau, 2010)? Third, do special districts affect local 
public sector size, measured by the tax or all own-source revenues as a share of total income in 
particular jurisdictions (Zax, 1989)? Fourth, given that multiple territorially overlapping special 
districts share the authority to provide services and levy taxes in a common geographic area, is 
there a common-pool problem, particularly, whether increasing the number of overlapping 
special districts results in overfishing from the shared tax base (Berry, 2009)? While the 
literature on special districts explores all of these questions, for this literature review, I will focus 
on what other scholars have found that pertains to the question this paper seeks to address; that 
is, the possible causes for the rapid growth of special districts.  
Several competing theories have been proposed to explain the determinants of the 
increase of special districts: (1) some studies find special districts are used to buffer 
policymaking from political pressure or to establish credible commitment with particular 
constituency and interest groups. Burns (1994), for example, claims real estate developers want 
the government to provide infrastructure investment to improve their property value, and this is 
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most easily achieved by creating a special district; (2) special districts assist in resolving 
problems of economy of scale in an inter-jurisdictional context8; (3) special districts are created 
to better match service provisions for appropriate areas of effect, and thereby improve allocative 
efficiency (Ostrom et al., 1988); (4) local governments use special districts to circumvent state-
imposed fiscal constraints such as debt limitations (Smith, 1964; Walsh, 1978; Bollens, 1986; 
Bunch, 1991; Sbragia, 1996; Wallis and Weingast, 2008; Radford, 2013) and tax and 
expenditure limitations (ACIR, 1962, 1977; MacManus, 1981; Bennett and DiLorenzo, 1982; 
Nelson, 1990; Bowler and Donvan, 2004; Carr, 2006; Goodman and Leland, 2014; Slivinski, 
2014)9; or, put differently, special districts are the direct products of the “politics of 
circumvention.”  
This paper is relevant to the fourth theory and aims to examine whether and how the use 
of special districts could be explained by the fiscal stringency of TELs. By TELs, I mean the 
TELs imposed on local governments by state governments (i.e., local-level TELs) instead of 
TELs imposed on state governments by themselves (i.e., state-level TELs). Although several 
TELs were passed before Proposition 13 in California, it is generally acknowledged that 
Proposition 13 began the modern anti-tax movement (Kioko and Martell, 2012). TEL measures 
continue to be popular to this day. Indiana and New York, for example, enacted TEL measures in 
2010 and 2011, respectively. Broadly, TELs have little effect on the overall size of the state and 
local public sector (Shadbegian, 1999; Sun, 2012; Mullins and Joyce, 1996). They do, however, 
have a significant impact on local revenue composition. Specifically, TELs lead to declining 
                                                          
8 However, it is a misconception that special districts are mainly established to deal with regional or cross-county problems. 
Statistics provided by the census of government clearly show that most special districts are within a specific county’s boundaries. 
9 In her seminal book, Foster (1997) argues that the first theory is a structuralist perspective, the third is a public choice viewpoint, 
and the fourth reflects spirits embedded in a metropolitan economy view. 
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reliance on broad-based taxes like the property tax (Bradbury et al., 2001; Dye et al., 2005) and 
increasing reliance on pro-cyclical revenues, including sales tax, income tax, user charges, and 
fees (Shadbegian, 1999; Hoene, 2004; Jung and Bae, 2011; Sun, 2012; McCubbins and Moule, 
2010; Skidmore, 1999). These changes lead to a significant loss in local fiscal autonomy and an 
expanded role for state governments (Sokolow, 2000; Saxton, Hoene, and Erie, 2001; Skidmore, 
1999; Thompson and Green, 2004). Because the property tax is used to fund K-12 education, 
TELs are also found to diminish the quality of education (Downes and Figlio, 1999), including 
the quality of the teaching workforce (Figlio and Rueben, 2001). In addition, TELs place an 
additional burden on governments through increased borrowing costs and lower ratings (Poterba 
and Rueben, 2001; Johnson and Kriz, 2005; Wagner 2004), where even the threat of a TEL is 
perceived negatively in the market (Benson and Marks, 2010). 
As a general rule, special districts are exempt from TELs imposed on local governments 
(Berry, 2009). This legal loophole makes it possible for new special districts to be formed by 
local governments to evade the fiscal pressure caused by TELs. The temporal coincidence 
between the modern anti-tax movement, which began in the 1970s, and the expansion of special 
districts also suggests a strong correlation between the two. The possible impacts of TELs on the 
use of special districts has long been discussed but not rigorously tested with updated datasets. 
Indeed, extant literature provides mixed evidence about the possible effects of TELs, both in case 
studies and in regression analysis.10  
Case studies conducted in several states find contradicting results. MacManus (1981) 
finds both property and tax restrictions are positively associated with increases in the number of 
                                                          
10 In contrast to the mixed findings on circumvention theory with attention to TELs, empirical results on the circumvention theory 
with respect to debt limits are basically consistent in the literature. 
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special districts in ten southern states. Bennett and Dilorenzo (1982) argue that local 
governments have responded to local-level TELs by dramatically increasing the number of 
special districts or off-budget enterprises (OBE), issuing more nonguaranteed debt and placing 
more expenditures off-budget in Pennsylvania, Indiana, Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, and 
Wisconsin, since the 1970s. Lewis (2000), however, indicates that Proposition 13 did not 
encourage reliance on special districts in California because local governments are more 
malleable than is commonly supposed, and they are often able to adapt to external fiscal 
constraints without resorting to the creation of new local governments.  
Regression analyses also fail to provide a consensus on this debate. Nelson (1990) claims 
fiscal limits imposed on municipalities are positively associated with the number of special 
districts. Similarly, McCabe (2000) finds positive connections between TELs and special 
districts by analyzing data from 1977 to 1992. Based on a sample from 1992 to 2002, Carr 
(2006) argues that when municipal- and county- TELs are jointly examined, larger numbers of 
special districts are seen in those states with the most restrictive TELs. Bowler and Donvan 
(2004) use data from 1977 to 1997 and find that state-level TEL adoption has a significant effect 
on the growth of both municipalities and special districts in states where ballot initiatives are 
easier to use. The most recent research, conducted by Goodman and Leland (2014)11, also 
supports the theory of the politics of circumvention. They use county-level data from 1972 to 
2007 and fixed-effects negative binomial regression12 to argue that circumvention appears to be 
largely a county phenomenon, rather than a strategy adopted by municipalities. Some of the 
recent evidence, however, refutes the belief in the use of special districts increasing in response 
                                                          
11 https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/2338036/Goodman_Leland_ABFM_2014_Presentation.pdf  
12 Interestingly, the conditional negative binomial model for panel data is not a true fixed–effects method. This method does not in 
fact control for all stable covariates (Allison and Waterman, 2002).  
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to the imposition of TELs over time. Heikkila and Ely (2003), for example, construct a sample 
from 1992 to 2002 and argue that property tax limits impose negative effects on the proliferation 
of special districts13. In her seminal work, Foster (1997) argues that heavy property tax limits on 
municipal governments reduced metropolitan reliance on special districts, as local officials 
realized that tax limits are reflective of an anti-tax sentiment for all types of local governments.14 
At least four reasons explain why previous investigations have achieved mixed findings. 
First, some empirical studies fail to clarify why they choose to use state-level TELs instead of 
local-level TELs. Although both of them are imposed by state governments, it is more 
appropriate to lock onto local-level TELs, as most special districts are initiated by local 
governments or local residents to address local service concerns. Second, the modern anti-tax 
ethos gained much more popularity in the 1970s and 1980s, and as a result, studies might 
produce different empirical findings when they are only focused on the 1990s and afterwards. 
Third, either positive evidence or negative associations are very likely to be statistical artifacts 
when substantial heterogeneities across regions and states are not adequately considered in 
empirical models. Fourth, related to the third point, both TEL laws and the use of special districts 
are probably jointly influenced by underlying fiscal conservativeness of citizens, which may vary 
over time and is difficult to measure and control. An estimation without considering the 
influence of underlying fiscal conservativeness may just capture a spurious correlation between 
TELs and the growth of special districts. The possible omitted variable bias, however, has not 
been seriously discussed in the existing literature.   
                                                          
13 It is noteworthy that they find that expenditure limits positively influence the use of special districts across states. 
14 A related study conducted by Berry (2009) shows that TELs couldn’t explain the aggregate own-source revenue across all 
governments in a county. But, his findings are not equivalent to saying that TELs have no impact on the growth of the number of 
special districts. 
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Before turning to my theoretical model, I would like to emphasize the heterogeneities in 
the function of special districts and the differences in TEL laws across states, which in turn 
require one to make careful assumptions regarding the unit of analysis, the measure of TELs, and 
the definition of growth of special districts. For example, because no two TELs are the same 
across states, it is unpersuasive to conduct empirical analysis using a single indicator of TELs. 
Thus, a convincing empirical analysis should first clarify the basic assumptions they made; then, 
check whether their assumptions can hold on the basis of theory and data; and finally, test 
whether estimation results are sensitive to alternative assumptions. More discussions on the 
assumptions I made in this paper will be presented in following sections.  
1.3. Analytical Framework   
Theoretically, TELs could affect the use of special districts in two conflicting ways 
through the same mediator—local governments. As described earlier, most special districts are 
initiated and created by local governments or citizens, pursuant state general-enabling 
legislations. So, to address fiscal pressures caused by TELs, local governments may pass on parts 
of the fiscal constraints by cutting their intergovernmental aids to special districts in their 
jurisdictions, slowing down the growth of special districts. The validity of this deterrent 
mechanism implicitly relies on a controversial assumption that, to some extent, cutting public 
services is acceptable to local residents. To approve this possible channel, one has to locate 
evidence that TELs result in a significant decrease of the aggregate fiscal aid from local 
governments to special districts.  
On the contrary, as suggested in circumvention theory, state-imposed TELs could also 
impose a positive impact on the use of special districts: namely, local governments may create 
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more special districts in order to circumvent the fiscal constraints caused by TELs. In doing so, 
local governments can maintain a satisfying quality of public services without incurring high tax 
burdens. Broadly, circumvention theory implies that TELs not only fail to reduce local on-budget 
revenue and expenditure size, but they also force local governments to seek new off-budget 
opportunities to survive, probably resulting in a higher true cost of public service. Different from 
the first possible channel, which views local general-purpose governments and special districts 
separately and independently, this second channel treats all types of local governments as an 
integrate local governance system in which special districts are complementary to counties and 
municipalities in public service provision. The validity of circumvention theory fundamentally 
relies on the prerequisite that creating more special districts is a necessary and relatively 
appealing circumvention tool compared with other circumvention options. Considering the fact 
that TELs result in a significant loss of local fiscal autonomy and an expanded role for state 
governments (Saxton et al., 2001; Sokolow, 2000; Skidmore, 1999; Thompson and Green, 2004), 
the second channel requires controlling for intergovernmental aids in my empirical model.  
Based on the aforementioned assumptions and extant literature, the number of special 
districts within a county is conceptually a function of four categories of variables. The first 
strand of variables includes the degree of fiscal stringency imposed by a series of fiscal 
institutions, including a variety of debt limits and TEL laws. Debt limits (i.e., dollar limits) and 
voter approval requirements (i.e., procedural limits) should be controlled for, as public 
authorities have been extensively involved in the so-called “backdoor borrowing” approach.15 
                                                          
15 For example, backdoor borrowing is the most egregious method that New York State uses to accumulate debt. Public authorities 
frequently borrow money but those actions are often hidden from the public eye, as they are neither approved by voters nor 
authorized by the state constitution. More information on the dramatic increase of public authority debt in New York can be found 
in the New York State’s Debt Policy: A Need for Reform, by the New York State Office of the State Comptroller in Feb. 2005. 
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Based on the literature, the relationship between debt-related limits and the use of special 
districts is expected to be positive. The state-imposed TELs, however, could either discourage or 
intensify the use of special districts, as discussed earlier.  
The second category is determinants of the cost and demand for public services. This 
includes population, population density, personal income per capita, employment level, the 
fraction of senior people more than 65 years old, the fraction of people below 19 years old, the 
proportion of black people, and the proportion of other racial groups. A larger population size 
may yield more special districts to provide public services, whereas a county with a larger 
population density is expected to have fewer special districts due to the possible economics of 
scale in the provision of public services. On the basis of Wagner’s “law,” both personal income 
and employment level per capita are expected to increase the demand for public services and 
thereby stimulate the use of special districts. The next four variables of the demographic 
composition are used to capture the various preference for public services. Adding racial 
heterogeneity also allows for a direct test of the conflicting viewpoints regarding the effects of 
racial heterogeneity on the formation of special districts between Burns (1994) and Alesina et al. 
(2004). Burns (1994) finds that counties with more African Americans had more special district 
formations, whereas Alesina et al. (2004) claim no significant relationship between racial 
heterogeneity and the number of special districts.16 17   
                                                          
16 It is worth noting that, instead of using a racial heterogeneity index, this paper directly puts the population fraction of each racial 
and age group in the regression, because a heterogeneity index cannot precisely distinguish the situation where a county has 70% 
white and 30% black from the “reverse” situation where a county has 30% white black and 70% black. A similar strategy is used 
in Berry (2009). 
17 Some structuralists may argue for the importance of county business patterns and developer interests (Burns, 1994; McCabe, 
2000). Foster (1997), however, tests this argument and fails to find any significant explanatory power of real estate developers in 
the formation of special districts. As she suggests, “property developers need not form special districts to achieve pro-growth goals” 
and “the availability of alternative pro-development institutional choices means special districts may, but need not necessarily, be 
a familiar institution in areas where pro-development sentiment is high.” Given the theoretical ambiguity of that argument in the 
literature, the lower reliability of simply using the number of real estate developers as a measure of real estate’s political and 
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Based on the existing studies on TELs, the third cluster includes local reliance on 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers, which could be explored by local governments to mitigate 
fiscal pressure when facing TELs. Logically, local governments don’t need to increase the use of 
special districts at all when there is sufficient state aids to offset the fiscal constraints of TELs 
and those aids are not subject to local-level TELs. In other words, inter-governmental aids should 
be controlled for, as they are likely to be one of the mediators between the fiscal stringency of 
TELs and the local incentive to use special districts.  
The fourth group encompass statewide legal determinants of the creation of special 
districts, including the aforementioned state general-enabling legislations, home rule policies, 
and the laws governing municipal annexation and incorporation. Specifically, states will have 
more special districts if they permit more kinds of special districts to be created. Without 
comprehensive and accurate information about those general-enabling laws, I use the functional 
breadth of special districts as a proxy measure and expect a positive connection between 
functional breadth and the number of special districts. In addition, home rules and laws on 
municipal annexation and incorporation are also expected to influence the feasibility and 
necessity of using special districts in the provision of public services. For instance, when 
municipalities could easily annex surrounding unincorporated areas or local residents could 
easily incorporate a city or a village to secure the provision of public services, new special 
districts are less likely to be formed.  
 
                                                          
marketing strategies, and the weak connection between local real estate developers and state-wide anti-tax movements, my model 
does not directly take into account the structuralist perspectives. Nevertheless, I control for the total number of jobs per county and 
personal income per capita in my model. 
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1.4. Data and Measures 
The number of independent special districts and their financial information is consistently 
available from the Census of Government dataset from 1972 to 2012. The government data is 
comprehensively collected every five years ending in a 2 or 7. Mullins and Wallin (2004) 
provide a summary of local-level TELs across states.18 Cost and demand variables can be 
obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The rest of this section will discuss data 
coding, measurement issues, and the final sample size, followed by a brief descriptive analysis.  
Three data and measurement issues possibly affect the validity of my estimation. First, an 
optimal approach to measure the degree of fiscal stringency of TELs is to calculate the fiscal gap 
between the actual revenue (or expenditure) size and the legal ceiling of revenue (or expenditure) 
size mandated by TELs. But this approach requires comprehensive and accurate legal 
information about the TELs’ fiscal coverage, and unfortunately, not every state and local 
government consistently provides it. Due to the infeasibility of calculating the exact degree of 
fiscal stringency imposed by TELs, I draw on the summary and classification of TELs by 
Mullins and Wallin (2004), and then develop four composite measures of TEL stringency to 
conduct the estimation. Basically, there are six important types of TEL laws constraining local 
revenue-collection capacity or expenditure size, including: 1) overall property tax rate limits 
applying to all local governments, 2) specific property tax rate limits applying to specific types 
of local governments or specific functions, 3) property tax levy (revenue) limits, 4) limits on 
property assessment increase, 5) general revenue increase limits, and 6) general expenditure 
                                                          
18  There is an exception. Based on publicly available data provided by the Illinois Department of Revenue, I have updated the 
local-level TEL codes in Illinois. (http://tax.illinois.gov/localgovernment/PropertyTax/PTELLcounties.pdf) 
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increase limits.19 The first composite measure I will use is a simple TEL indicator, which equals 
1 as long as local governments are imposed to any of the six types of TEL limits. Based on the 
common understanding that TELs will be binding when they are imposed on property tax rate 
and property assessment together, I develop the second composite indicator, which seeks to 
measure whether binding property tax TELs have different effects than a simple TEL indicator. 
The third and fourth indicators equal 1 when local governments face general revenue increase 
limits and general expenditure limits, respectively. Supposing the politics of circumvention exist, 
at least one of the four above measures is expected to have positive and significant effects on the 
growth of special districts, both statistically and financially. One advantage of this approach, 
compared with just using a single TEL indicator, is that four measures are more likely to capture 
multiple facets of TEL laws across states, thus helping us to better understand the real 
circumvention mechanisms, if any. In addition to the four composite indicators, I also adopt the 
TEL index developed by Deller et al. (2012). The index takes into account the type and scope of 
TELs, exemption provisions, and methods of override, so it will approximately measure the 
degree of fiscal stringency of TELs. Nevertheless, the estimation results of using the TEL index 
should be consistent with those of using four composite measures, as they are all formulated out 
of the same law provisions. 
Second, the unit of analysis is county area, but usually there are two layers of general-
purpose governments in a county area: a county government and some municipality 
governments.20 In other words, the unit of analysis is not equal to the behavioral unit. So, one 
challenging task is to identify the specific layer of general-purpose governments that possibly 
                                                          
19 Full disclosure is not included in this study as it simply requires some type of public discussion and specific legislative vote prior 
to the enactment of tax rate or levy increase. It neither directly targets fiscal limits nor has binding effects on local fiscal power.  
20 The majority of American states don’t have towns or townships. 
25 
 
adopt circumvention strategies. More often than not, state governments impose TELs on counties 
and municipalities at the same time, and the correlation between the TELs on the two layers of 
governments is quite high.21 In addition, as far as I am aware, no theory sheds light on the 
behavioral assumption that county and municipality behavior substantially differ in response to a 
similar, if not the same, set of state fiscal policies within a state. Based on the assumption that 
counties and cities behave in a consistent way, I systematically synthesize the county-level TELs 
and municipality-level TELs for all composite measures. That is to say, I impose further 
restrictions on the way to code composite indicators. For example, the first composite TEL 
indicator will be assigned to be one only when both the county-level TEL indicator and 
municipality-level TEL indicator equal one. By doing so, I treat all local general-purpose 
governments the same and thus, my estimation explores how TELs affect the dynamics between 
all general-purpose governments as a whole and all special districts. 
Third, I want to clarify how “missing” values are handled in my analysis and briefly 
introduce the final sample size. In the Census of Government data set, some counties do not 
report any special districts information even in census years, and consequently, they are 
presented as “missing” values in my sample. Given the fact that some counties do not have any 
special districts during the early years in my sample and many special districts are established as 
“ad-hoc” institutions or have a very short time span, I assign 0 to the number of special districts 
for the counties with “missing” values.22 The final sample excludes counties or county-
equivalent entities in Alaska, DC, and Hawaii, as they are usually considered to be very different 
                                                          
21 Based on my own calculation, the correlation coefficient between the TELs on counties and those on municipalities is almost 
0.9. 
22 My final results are not substantially affected by the way I deal with missing values. Sensitivity tests were conducted and they 
are available from the author upon request.  
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from those in other states. Independent cities are not taken into account either, because 
geographically and administratively, independent cities like those in Virginia are not comparable 
to typical counties. By the census definition and statistics from 2010 23, there are 3,044 active 
counties and legally-defined inactive counties in total24 and 18 county-city consolidated entities, 
like New York City and San Francisco City25, which are also considered to be good candidates in 
need of special districts in the 48 Continental United States. After merging the Census of 
Government dataset with economic statistics provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, I 
lose 24 counties in Virginia as the economic and demographic statistics (e.g., personal income 
and employment data) for those counties are bundled with their neighboring independent cities 
and I cannot separate them. Ultimately, I get 3,038 counties in 2007, among which five counties 
were established after 1972, and the remaining 3,033 counties have complete panels over all 8 
periods (i.e., 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007) in my sample. 
As shown in Table 2, on average, each county has around 10 special districts from 1972 -
2007, almost 60% of which are taxing districts and the remaining 40% are public authorities. 
Harris County, within the Houston–The Woodlands–Sugar Land metropolitan area of Texas, 
uses special districts most frequently, with 465 special districts in 1992. Special districts 
basically achieve budget balance since their average revenue and average expenditure are 
roughly the same. It is interesting to find that 49% of the revenues of special districts come from 
general charges and miscellaneous sources, with less than 10% from local property tax levies. 
This is consistent with a common notion that even though they are generally exempted from 
                                                          
23More information can be found at https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/codes/cou.html  
24 Legally-defined inactive or nonfunctioning counties include those in Connecticut, Rhode Island, and some in Massachusetts. 
Those counties do not have real county-level governments, and they mainly exist for geographical and statistical purpose. But given 
that my unit of analysis is county area rather county government, I include them in my analysis. 
25 My final results are also very robust to the exclusion of city-county consolidated entities like New York City and San Francisco 
City. Empirical results based on the sample without those entities are available from the author upon request. 
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TELs imposed on municipalities, special districts prefer to use other financial tools rather than 
property taxes, which are traditionally tapped by other local governments. Special districts use 
debt extensively and their average long-term outstanding debt is almost twice as large as their 
expenditure size. TELs have been widely adopted, yet very few states impose fiscal constraints 
on the local general revenue and general expenditure size, largely because they are much more 
binding than simply imposing a limit on property tax rate. 
1.5. Empirical Strategies 
This paper aims to test the impacts of TELs on special districts by exploiting the variation 
of the number of special districts across counties in the U.S. Towards that end, there are two 
methodological challenges facing this research.  
First, a positive (negative) association between TELs and the number of special districts 
would hardly be conclusive evidence of the circumvention (deterrent) effects we hypothesized. 
Existing studies also question the assumption that TELs are randomly assigned across states in 
empirical work on TELs (Rueben, 1997; Shabegian, 1999; Poterba and Rubin, 2001; Wagner, 
2004; and Sun, 2014). Any omitted variable at the state/county level associated with both the 
propensity to adopt TEL laws and their preference in using special districts would lead to biased 
coefficients. Thus, my basic empirical strategy is to look within counties across time and 
measure how their number of special districts changed as a function of the adoption of TEL laws. 
The estimation could be represented by the following equation, with county as the unit of 
analysis: 
（1） 𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑡 +  𝛿𝐴𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑡 +  𝜌𝑆𝑠𝑡 + 𝑊𝑟𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑡 
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Where i indexes counties, s indexes states, r indexes regions, t indexes periods, Y indicates the 
number of special districts in a county, L is a dummy variable coded as one if county i faces TEL 
laws in year t, X is a vector of cost and demand for public services in each county, A is 
intergovernmental aid received by local governments aggregated at the county level, S is a series 
of legal determinants of the creation of special districts at the state level, W is region-year 
dummies designed to capture linear and non-linear regional time trends, µ is a vector of county 
fixed effects, 𝜃 is a vector of year fixed effects, and 𝜖 is error term.  
One advantage of this model is that all time-invariant factors that affect the growth of 
special districts will be subsumed into county-level fixed effects (i.e., 𝜇𝑖). For instance, as 
explained earlier, revenue bonds could be issued by special districts without being restricted by 
voters’ approval requirements or dollar limits. This institutional loophole, established prior to the 
sample period in the analysis, has stimulated local governments to create special districts to 
accumulate debt (Sbragia, 1996; Foster, 1997; Weingast and Wallis, 2008). The existing 
incorporation power of local residents, annexation ability of local governments, and home rule 
policies are also relevant to the feasibility and necessity of forming new special districts. 
Geographical features impose another influence on the use of special districts in water supply, 
drainage, and irrigation. By using a fixed effects model, all of those time-invariant institutional, 
legal, and geographical factors will be implicitly controlled.  
Accounting for time-invariant unobservable factors with a fixed effects model is a step in 
the right direction but is unlikely to eliminate all bias in the estimate of β. As discussed in the 
literature review section, underlying fiscal conservativeness varies over time, and it may affect 
both the propensity of adopting TELs and the use of special districts in a state/county. A further 
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challenge is that the direction of possible bias caused by the omitted fiscal conservativeness is 
theoretically unclear. On the one hand, voter support for TEL measures, like Proposition 13, has 
been largely driven by a desire for lower taxes and more efficiency in government26 (Levy, 1975; 
Ladd and Wilson, 1982). Stated differently, fiscally conservative voters are more likely to vote 
for TELs or more-stringent TELs. Meanwhile, they might be against the growth of special 
districts as special districts finance public services via taxation or collecting user fees, neither of 
which will decrease public service costs. In that case, voters’ fiscal conservativeness will 
positively affect the adoption of TELs and negatively affect the growth of special districts, 
thereby introducing negative bias into my OLS estimation. On the other hand, fiscally 
conservative voters may think “businesslike” special districts are more efficient than traditional 
general-purpose governments, so that they may prefer to use more special districts in many 
service aspects. The second possibility, then, leads to a positive bias in my OLS estimation.  
To address the concern related to the possible omitted variable bias caused by time-
varying fiscal conservativeness, I have improved the estimation model by adding two political 
taste variables as approximate measures for voters’ fiscal conservativeness. As suggested in 
Gilligan and Matsusaka (1995), political taste and climate may affect fiscal behaviors and 
institutional choice in a state. Specifically, I incorporate a state government ideology index 
(Berry et al., 2010) and a citizen ideology index (Berry et al., 1998) in Equation (1), both of 
which are operationalized by interest-group ratings compiled by the Americans for Democratic 
Action (ADA) and the AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education (COPE). The state 
government ideology index measures the average location of the elected officials in each state on 
a liberal-conservative continuum, with 100 being the most liberal value and 0 being the most 
                                                          
26 But voters by no means want reduced public services, as clearly suggested in the literature. 
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conservative value. The citizen ideology index measures the average location of the active 
electorate in each state on the same continuum (Berry et al., 2010).27 As a result, the final 
empirical model is below: 
（2） 𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑡 +  𝛿𝐴𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑡 +  𝜌𝑆𝑠𝑡 + 𝐶𝑠𝑡 + 𝑊𝑟𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑡 
Where the added C indexes fiscal conservativeness, approximately measured by the state 
government ideology index and citizen ideology index.   
In addition to employing fixed effects, controlling for two approximate measures of fiscal 
conservativeness, and incorporating regional time trends28 to eliminate bias in the estimate of β 
caused by time-invariant factors and time-varying fiscal conservativeness, I perform two 
fundamental checks to further address the concern that other time-varying factors, like 
unobserved state-specific time trends in both a state’s probability to adopt TELs and its 
propensity of building special districts, may drive the positive/negative association between 
TELs and the number of special districts. First, I examine the change of β after adding state-
specific time trends to Equation (2). Namely, I alternatively estimate the following model: 
（3） 𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑡 + γ𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑡 +  𝛿𝐴𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑡 +  𝜌𝑆𝑠𝑡 + 𝐶𝑠𝑡 + 𝑊𝑟𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝑇𝑅𝑠 +  𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑡 
                                                          
27  The state government ideology index assumes that “state officials mirror their federal counterparts, i.e., that the average 
ideological position of state elected officials from each party matches the mean ideological position of that party’s congressional 
delegation, as measured by ADA and COPE scores.” Assuming that “voters choose the candidate they perceive as having an 
ideology closest to their own,” the citizen ideology index “infers the ideological position of the electorate from the distribution of 
votes in congressional races and ADA/COPE scores for members of Congress.” (Berry et al., 2010) 
28 The region-year dummies could be helpful in further controlling for the fact that states in west regions are usually more 
conservative than states in other regions and many other heterogeneities such as economic structure, climate change, and migration 
across regions and across time. However, because TELs are more stringent and more widely adopted in western states, adding 
region-year dummies will absorb the variation of TELs and thereby reduce the explanatory power of TELs, driving the estimate of 
β smaller. In this sense, the estimate obtained in Equation (2) could be understood as a conservative estimate of the true effect of 
TELs. Indeed, I alternatively run Equation (2) without controlling for regional trends, finding stronger results of TELs, and these 
results are available from the author upon request. 
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Where 𝑇𝑅𝑠indicates state-specific time trends. If β in Equation (3) became statistically and 
economically insignificant, the circumvention/deterrent effect obtained in Equation (2) would be 
less credible. Second, I examine the pattern of the use of special districts not only during the 
years right after adopting TEL laws but also during the years immediately before the adoption. 
This “even-time specification” could be described by the following equation: 
（4） 𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽−4𝑇 − 4𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑡 +  𝛽−2𝑇 − 2𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽0𝑇0𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇2𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇4𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑡 +
𝛽6𝑇6𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑇8𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑇10𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑡 +  𝛿𝐴𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑡 +  𝜌𝑆𝑠𝑡 + 𝐶𝑠𝑡 + 𝑊𝑟𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 +
 𝑇𝑅𝑠 + 𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑡 
Where T-2 is a dummy variable indicating the two years before a county is confronted with TEL 
laws, T0 correspond to the year of adoption of TELs, T2 correspond to the two years 
immediately following the adoption of TELs. Because most TELs were enacted in the 1970s and 
1980s, the average time length before TELs is shorter than the average time length after TELs. 
Thus, Equation (4) captures more post-treatment periods.29 In the years before a county imposed 
TELs, any significant increase in the number of special districts would undermine the 
circumvention hypothesis. 
Second, direct control for contemporary inter-governmental aid variables will lead to 
endogeneity problems as both fiscal transfers from upper-level governments to local 
governments and those to special districts could be simultaneously influenced by state 
governments’ financial management strategies and political pressure from interest groups and 
other behaviors. To avoid the endogeneity problem, I adopt 5-year lagged inter-governmental aid 
                                                          
29 I also tried alternative model specifications. For example, I designed a model that captures the annual use of special districts 
from five years prior to TELs through fifteen years after TELs. Basically, the results are consistent with Equation 4. 
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variables in my model. By the same token, to address the possible concern that the function, the 
number, and the size of special districts may be simultaneously planned and determined, I use 
functional breadth lagged by five years as an approximate measure of state general-enabling laws 
in my model. While using lags could relieve endogeneity concerns, it is important to note that 
my results do not substantially change in any sense if I simply use contemporaneous values of 
intergovernmental aids or functional breadth. The results with a contemporaneous value of those 
variables will be presented in the robustness check section. 
1.6. Empirical Results  
1.6.1. TELs and the Number of Special Districts 
Table 3 shows the estimation results for five models, all of which are based on Equation 
(2), but each has a different measure of TEL. For Model 1, the number of special districts in a 
county area is regressed on the first composite TEL indicators. Namely, when both counties and 
municipalities in a county area are confronted with any state-imposed TELs, local governments 
and/or residents will establish 0.567 more special districts to circumvent the fiscal pressure of 
TELs, holding all other factors constant. Model 2 captures the impact of binding property tax 
TELs on the use of special districts; as expected, the treatment effect is stronger because the 
second composite indicator is more binding than the first one. Model 3 and Model 4 aim to test 
the impact that the two most binding TEL laws have on the growth of special districts; one is the 
TELs that cap the general revenue size, and the other one is the TELs that restrict the general 
expenditure size. Although only a couple of states enacted such binding limitations and the use 
of regional time trends may undermine the explanatory power of those measures, it is still clear 
that TELs stimulate the creation of special districts. The last column investigates whether the 
effects of TELs on special districts is consistent with a numeric measure of TELs – TEL Index. 
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Again, a positive effect is found, although it is hard to give an intuitive explanation of the 
estimate.  
Most of the other variables controlled for in Equation (2) also get a meaningful estimate. 
As expected, population size and population density are significantly and positively associated 
with the use of special districts. Personal income is also significantly and positively connected to 
the number of special districts, whereas the number of jobs doesn’t play an important role in the 
models. Regarding racial heterogeneity, my results are consistent with Burns (1994). 
Specifically, I find counties with larger shares of black people are much more likely to build new 
special districts, which contrasts with the argument that “arrangements for special districts are 
idiosyncratic” with respect to racial heterogeneity (Alesina et al., 2004). Different age groups 
seem to compete for limited financial resources, leading to a fact reflected in the estimation 
results: a larger proportion of young students reduces the use of special districts. Because there 
are not many special districts for educational purposes, it makes sense that school districts and 
special districts compete with each other for securing financial resources. In addition, after 
receiving more intergovernmental transfer from state governments, it seems local governments 
are relieved from fiscal pressures to the extent that they are discouraged from creating additional 
special districts. In addition, state general-enabling laws, approximately measured by the 
functional breadth in my model, positively affect the number of special districts. The two 
approximate measures of fiscal conservativeness achieve different results, which demonstrates 
the uncertainty of estimation bias if we had not controlled for fiscal conservativeness.  
As discussed before, the estimation looks within counties across time and measures how 
their number of special districts changed as a function of the adoption of TEL laws. To make 
34 
 
sure that states with TELs and states without TELs have parallel trends in creating special 
districts before the adoption of TELs, I estimate Equation (3), which adds state-specific time 
trends to Equation (2). As shown in the first two columns in Table 4, the two models are 
consistent, as the significant effects of TELs on the number of special districts are very 
comparable, both statistically and economically. That is to say, the positive and significant 
empirical findings are driven by TELs rather than by any state-specific time trends in both a 
state’s probability to adopt TELs and its propensity towards building special districts. To further 
exclude other explanations of the increasing trends of special districts, I estimate Equation (4), 
which captures the number of special districts not only during the post-treatment periods but also 
during the years before the events occur. Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of the 
estimation results of Equation (4). The y-axis has been scaled so that the number of special 
districts is normalized to approximately zero. The notable increase in the number of special 
districts comes after the adoption of TELs30.   
1.6.2. TELs and the Fiscal Aid from Local Governments to Special Districts 
As analyzed in the literature review section, the flip side of the circumvention effect is 
the deterrent effect. If the deterrent effect were true, we are supposed to see that local 
governments would substantially reduce fiscal support of the special districts they established. 
To test the deterrent effect, I directly estimate how TELs affect the aggregate fiscal aid that all 
special districts have received from local general-purpose governments in a county area. As 
shown in the third column of Table 4, I didn’t find any empirical evidence for the deterrent story. 
                                                          
30 The big jump of the number of special districts after the adoption of TELs is robust to several alternative model specifications. 
Regression results are available upon request from the author. 
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In a nutshell, all estimation results from Equation (2) to Equation (4) clearly support the 
circumvention story. Compared with other strategies, such as changing revenue composition, 
contracting services out to private entities, and relying more on state aids, which have been well 
documented in extant studies, creating new special districts is still comparatively appealing to 
local governments after the 1970s.  
1.7. Robustness Check 
This section further examines whether my empirical findings are sensitive to the use of 
lagged control variables and a possible Instrumental Variable (IV) approach.31 
First, as discussed earlier, endogeneity problems may arise when contemporaneous 
values of functional breadth are employed in the estimation model, as state governments may 
simultaneously determine the type, which is one of the right-hand side variables, and the number 
of special districts, which is the left-hand side variable. By the same token, the inclusion of 
contemporaneous values of intergovernmental aid may be problematic, especially in Model 6, as 
state governments may strategically strike a balance between two fiscal-relief approaches to help 
local governments, one is fiscal support via intergovernmental aid, and the other one is 
institutional support via the permission to create special districts. In that case, the estimated 
treatment effect of TELs on the number of special districts will be biased. So, I use one-period 
lagged functional breadth and intergovernmental aid in Equations (2) – (4). However, it is 
reasonable to check that my estimation results are not purely or largely driven by this empirical 
strategy. My first robustness check is to examine the empirical results of using contemporaneous 
                                                          
31 In addition, I test whether my results are robust to alternative sets of IVs and using the log form of the number of special districts 
as the dependent variable. Basically the results are consistent and they are available upon request from the author. 
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values of those variables in my estimation. As shown in the first column of Table 5, the point 
estimate is very consistent with what I received previously, namely, when local governments 
face TELs, on average 0.732 more special districts will be established in a county area.32  
Second, I use a combination of fixed effects, regional time trends, and approximate 
measures for fiscal conservativeness to eliminate bias in the estimate of β in the main analysis. 
Another way to tease out the effects of TELs on the number of special districts from those of 
unobserved factors that influence both TELs and the number of special districts is to employ an 
instrumental variable (IV) approach. In principle, good IVs are supposed to theoretically explain 
the endogenous regressor but have no direct effects on the dependent variable except through the 
endogenous regressor. Given my use of panel data and county fixed effects, the IV candidates 
also need to have sufficient time series variation. These restrictions determine that many 
variables, which have been used as instruments for TELs in existing cross-sectional studies but 
basically are constant over time after the 1970s, are not appropriate to be used as IVs anymore in 
my study; these include: (1) an indicator that equals unity if voters can initiate an amendment to 
the state’s constitution directly, (2) an indicator that equals unity if voters must submit ballot 
measures for legislative review, and (3) an indicator that equals unity if citizens must satisfy a 
geographic signature requirement to propose initiatives, etc. Furthermore, because the initiative 
process is only allowed in 24 states, the number of voter initiatives and the passage rate of voter 
initiatives are not convincing IVs, either; even though they have variation over time and are 
employed in the extant literature.  
                                                          
32 Consistent results are also found for Model 2 – Model 5. All TEL measures have a positive and significant impact on the number 
of special districts. Due to space limitation, these outcomes are not reported here, but they are available upon request from the 
author.  
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A combination of two historical observations provides the first potential IV. First, the 
U.S. has witnessed two waves of tax revolt movements in history, both of which resulted in TEL 
laws that were imposed by states on local governments. The first wave mainly spanned from late 
in the 19th century to the start of World War II, whereas the second wave (i.e., the modern one) 
has been put in place after the 1970s. For example, Arizona State imposed the first wave of TELs 
on counties and municipalities in 1913, and then enacted modern TEL laws in 1980. Because 
most of the former TELs occurred before the 1940s, it is reasonable to believe that they might be 
positively related to the second wave of TELs, but had little to do with the special districts which 
were created approximately 40 years later. Second, voters are more likely to push TEL laws 
when they are much more conservative than before. That’s to say, a relative change of voter 
conservativeness over time within a state, which can be measured by the subtraction of the 
current value of citizen ideology index from the corresponding value five years ago, could 
predict the probability of adopting TELs. The relative change in conservativeness in a five-year 
period could be understood as part of the idiosyncratic deviations from the general trend of 
conservativeness. Based on the logic that states with a first-wave of TELs are more responsive to 
the tax-revolt movement when the citizens become more conservative than before, the first 
instrumental variable I chose is an interaction term between the indicator of the first-wave of 
TELs and the relative conservativeness within a five-year period.   
Based on the logic that TELs are proposed because voters want lower taxes and higher 
efficiency of government, the second IV I pick up is the tension between citizens and the state 
government, which is measured by the difference between the citizen ideology index and state 
government ideology index. The empirical results of the IV approach is exhibited in the second 
column of Table 5. It turns out that the two IVs predict the probability of adopting the modern 
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TELs very well, and as expected, both are significantly negative in the first stage. Basically, all 
of these find consistent empirical evidence to buttress the theory of the politics of circumvention.  
1.8. Conclusion 
The local landscape of American fiscal federalism has been characterized by the rapid 
growth of special districts over the past several decades. Several fundamental issues about the 
origins, institutional design, political accountability, and growth of special districts, however, 
remain unclear. This paper investigates whether the growth of special districts could be partly 
explained by the expansion of tax and expenditure limitations. The existing literature doesn’t 
conceptually sort out different channels through which TELs may affect the increase of special 
districts, nor empirically discuss and address the omitted variable bias. This paper aims to fill in 
the intellectual gap by employing 35-year long panel data to test the impacts of TELs on special 
districts.  
To eliminate possible bias in the estimate of β caused by time-invariant factors and time-
varying fiscal conservativeness, my empirical models adopt fixed effects, control for two 
approximate measures of fiscal conservativeness, and incorporate regional time trends. I also 
perform two fundamental checks to ensure that common trend assumption is met. Basically, I 
find that TELs increase the number of special districts in a county, and the results are consistent 
across four indicators of TEL laws and a TEL index. The empirical findings lend solid support to 
the politics of circumvention theory, suggesting that local governments circumvent fiscal 
constraints caused by TELs by creating more special districts to finance public services. In 
addition, this paper directly examines the concern that local governments, when facing TELs, 
may reduce their fiscal transfer to special districts in their jurisdictions. I find no empirical 
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evidence for this possible deterrent effect. My estimation results are robust to alternative model 
specifications and empirical strategies.  
Together with the consensus achieved in the literature that that many special districts 
were designed to circumvent debt limits (dollar limits of debt) and voter approval requirements 
(procedural limits of debt), the circumvention effects of TELs provide additional evidence that 
intergovernmental fiscal rules have substantially shaped the formation and growth of special 
districts in the U.S. The unintended proliferation of special districts also reveals that local 
governments have never been passive creatures and they are always full of “entrepreneurship” in 
addressing external pressure. The “entrepreneurship” may help local governments to strike a 
balance between the demand for public services and the political pressure from the public, but it 
may also complicate the local governance system and further blur, or even enhance, the true cost 
of public services. The subsequent problems worthy of further investigation include: 1) whether 
TELs are appropriate to the extent that they effectively lower the cost and improve government 
efficiency, and 2), whether special districts are desirable to local residents as byproducts of 
TELs.  
It is important to note that all of the special districts in my sample are independent ones. 
Actually, many dependent special districts that are either affiliated with any governments or any 
governmental departments have also been widely used within governments. Due to the 
substantial difference between these two types of special districts, the estimation results in this 
paper could not be generalized to dependent special districts. Actually, New York State has 
begun to clear up the real number of total special districts and improve the accountability issues 
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raised by so many invisible governments.33 But, as I am aware, not every state has started to 
work on this, and therefore, it is impossible to expand my research to a sample with 
comprehensive information on dependent special districts across states. In addition, due to the 
lack of annual data and the lumpy nature of capital investment, this paper cannot investigate how 
TELs affect local governments’ strategies in accumulating debt via “backdoor” borrowing or 
issuing non-guaranteed debt. These important topics belong to a future research agenda. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
33 More information about special districts in NY could be found in the following link:  
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/datanstat/findata/index_choice.htm  
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Figure 1.1: The Number of Local Governments, 1952 - 2007 
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Figure 1.2: The Growth of Special Districts, 1972-2007 
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Figure 1.3: The Creation of Special Districts in Event Time 
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Table 1.1: The Structure of Four TEL Indicators 
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Note: This table is heavily based on discussion in Mullins and Wallin (2004) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics  
VARIABLES N Mean SD Min Max 
Aggregate Data of Special Districts at County Level 
Total Number of Special districts 24,285 10.05 15.85 0 465 
Total Number of Public Authorities 24,285 4.114 6.746 0 138 
Total Number of Taxing districts 24,285 5.936 12.30 0 359 
Total Revenue Per Capita 24,285 131.1 373.0 0 14,833 
Total Rev. Own Sources Per Capita 24,285 109.3 359.3 0 14,830 
Total Property Tax Per Capita 24,285 12.80 35.77 0 889.3 
Total Charge and Misc. Rev. Per Capita  24,285 64.15 162.0 0 4,739 
Total Intergovt. Aids Per Capita 24,285 21.84 56.19 0 2,803 
Total Intergovt. Aids From Local Govt. Per Capita 24,285 4.314 18.86 0 670.4 
Total Expenditure Per Capita 24,285 131.9 436.7 0 22,669 
Total Capital Outlay Per Capita 24,285 26.47 166.0 0 14,538 
Total L.T. Debt Issued Per Capita 24,285 26.43 310.7 0 20,333 
Total L.T. Debt Outstanding Per Capita 24,285 248.1 1,820 0 75,052 
A Proxy Measure of State General-Enabling Legislations   
Functional Breadth of Special Districts  24,285 16.62 4.939 4 28 
The Reliance of Local General-Purpose Governments on Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers 
Total Intergovt. Rev. From State Per Capita 24,285 169.4 176.4 0 3,088 
Total Intergovt. Rev. From Federal Per Capita 24,285 31.00 72.31 0 7,526 
Cost And Demand Variables for Public Services 
County Size 24,285 1,022 1,336 25.96 20,105 
Total Population 24,285 80,701 295,203 75 9.706e+06 
Population Density 24,285 131.0 529.2 0.111 17,215 
Employment: Number of Jobs Per Capita 24,285 0.469 0.140 0.114 5.022 
Personal Income Per Capita 24,285 11,780 3,345 3,716 59,859 
Population Share: White 24,285 89.14 15.09 3.155 100 
Population Share: Black 24,285 8.555 14.32 0 86.83 
Population Share: Other Racial Groups 24,285 2.306 6.162 0 96.81 
Population Share: Age 0_19  24,285 30.92 4.840 11.52 54.77 
Population Share: Age 20_64 24,285 54.88 4.181 38.83 77.85 
Population Share: Age 65_more 24,285 14.19 4.256 0.886 38.69 
Population Share: Male 24,285 49.34 1.750 42.78 88.69 
Approximate Measures of Fiscal Conservativeness 
State Government Ideology Index 24,285 44.69 14.32 6.533 95.97 
Citizen Ideology Index 24,285 54.08 19.58 6.514 95.58 
Four Indicators and An Index of Modern TELs 
TEL Indicator (C&M) 24,285 0.536 0.499 0 1 
Binding Property Tax TEL Indicator (C&M) 24,285 0.429 0.495 0 1 
General Revenue TEL Indicator (C&M) 24,285 0.0290 0.168 0 1 
General Expenditure TEL Indicator (C&M) 24,285 0.0399 0.196 0 1 
TEL Index (Statewide) 24,285 13.97 8.715 0 38 
First Wave of TELs 
TEL Indicator (C&M) First Wave 24,285 0.593 0.491 0 1 
*All variables of the first cluster are aggregate data of special districts at the county level. For example, “Total Revenue 
Per Capita” means the total revenue per capita for all special districts in a particular county. “Functional Breadth of 
Special Districts” calculates the total functional categories of special districts in a state, as a proxy measure of state 
general enabling legislation. The two variables of the third cluster are the aggregate intergovernmental revenues received 
by local general purpose governments from upper-level governments. “TEL Index” is derived from Deller et al. (2012). 
**C&M, as explained in the text, means the corresponding TEL laws are imposed to county and municipality together.  
***All financial and economic statistics are deflated by CPI index with 1983 as the base year. 
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Table 1.3: Regression Results (All Models Are Based on Equation 2) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
TEL Indicator 0.567***     
 (0.167)     
Binding Property Tax TEL Indicator  0.770***    
  (0.148)    
General Revenue TEL Indicator   1.805***   
   (0.627)   
General Expenditure TEL Indicator    0.777  
    (0.676)  
TEL Index     0.0366** 
     (0.0164) 
Population (log) 3.475*** 3.458*** 3.387*** 3.387*** 3.362*** 
 (0.916) (0.910) (0.905) (0.912) (0.905) 
Population Density 0.008* 0.008* 0.008* 0.008* 0.008* 
 (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0045) 
Personal Income Per Capita 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0002** 
 (6.93e-05) (6.89e-05) (6.94e-05) (6.94e-05) (6.95e-05) 
Number of Jobs Per Capita 0.343 0.338 0.375 0.412 0.398 
 (0.672) (0.673) (0.655) (0.667) (0.664) 
Black Share of Population 0.137*** 0.136*** 0.138*** 0.140*** 0.137*** 
 (0.0462) (0.0459) (0.0461) (0.0462) (0.0460) 
Other Share of Population 0.0299 0.0226 0.0441 0.0363 0.0337 
 (0.0585) (0.0586) (0.0587) (0.0588) (0.0585) 
Population Share with Age 0_19 -0.0775* -0.0753* -0.0750* -0.0754* -0.0722 
 (0.0435) (0.0436) (0.0439) (0.0433) (0.0439) 
Population Share with Age 65_more 0.0282 0.0278 0.0295 0.0278 0.0311 
 (0.0478) (0.0476) (0.0480) (0.0477) (0.0479) 
Federal Intgov. Revenue Per Capita -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
State Intergov. Revenue Per Capita -0.0014** -0.0015** -0.0013** -0.0014** -0.0014** 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Functional Breadth of Special Districts 0.122*** 0.139*** 0.0908*** 0.102*** 0.113*** 
 (0.0258) (0.0262) (0.0236) (0.0239) (0.0257) 
Citizen Ideology Index 0.0224*** 0.0183** 0.0226*** 0.0232*** 0.0213** 
 (0.0087) (0.0085) (0.0087) (0.0086) (0.0088) 
State Government Ideology Index -0.0094*** -0.0089*** -0.0096*** -0.0089*** -0.0091*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020) 
Constant -30.91*** -31.14*** -29.03*** -29.21*** -29.69*** 
 (10.05) (9.916) (9.882) (9.990) (10.02) 
Observations 21,247 21,247 21,247 21,247 21,247 
R-squared 0.949 0.949 0.949 0.949 0.949 
County FE & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional Time Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intergov. Aid & Functional Breadth Lag Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: The dependent variables are the total number of special districts per county. Clustered standard errors 
are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 1.4: Regression Results 
VARIABLES Model 1 
(Based on Equation 2) 
Model 1 
(Based on Equation 3) 
Model 6 
(Base on Equation 2) 
TEL Indicator 0.567*** 0.327*** -0.495 
 (0.167) (0.121) (0.482) 
Population (log) 3.475*** 3.768*** -1.057 
 (0.916) (1.050) (2.138) 
Population Density 0.0080* 0.0088* -0.0021 
 (0.0045) (0.0047) (0.0062) 
Personal Income Per Capita 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002 
 (6.93e-05) (5.63e-05) (0.0003) 
Number of Jobs Per Capita 0.343 0.354 0.890 
 (0.672) (0.550) (6.282) 
Black Share of Population 0.137*** 0.129*** -0.0468 
 (0.0462) (0.0461) (0.139) 
Other Share of Population 0.0299 0.0790 0.308 
 (0.0585) (0.0691) (0.311) 
Population Share with Age 0_19 -0.0775* -0.0044 -0.116 
 (0.0435) (0.0436) (0.181) 
Population Share with Age 65_more 0.0282 0.129** -0.157 
 (0.0478) (0.0505) (0.153) 
Federal Intgov. Revenue Per Capita -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0011 
 (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0013) 
State Intergov. Revenue Per Capita -0.0014** -0.0008 0.0057 
 (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0038) 
Functional Breadth of Special Districts 0.122*** -0.0146 0.0513 
 (0.0258) (0.0156) (0.0706) 
Citizen Ideology Index 0.0224*** -4.99e-05 -0.0068 
 (0.0087) (0.0048) (0.0242) 
State Government Ideology Index -0.0094*** -0.0034** 0.0278*** 
 (0.002) (0.0013) (0.0103) 
Constant -30.91*** -56.88* 15.90 
 (10.05) (30.34) (23.37) 
Observations 21,247 21,247 21,247 
R-squared 0.949 0.954 0.407 
County FE & Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Regional Time Trends Yes Yes Yes 
Intergov.Aid & Functional Breadth Lag Yes Yes Yes 
State-Specific Time Trends  Yes  
Note: The dependent variable of Model 1 is the total number of special districts per county, both in 
column 1 which is based on Equation 2 and column 2 which is based on Equation 3. The dependent 
variable in Model 6 is the total amount of intergovernmental aid all special districts have received from 
local governments in a county area. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
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Table 1.5: Robustness Check 
VARIABLES Model 1 
(Without Lags) 
Model 1 
(IV Approach) 
TEL Indicator 0.732*** 4.343*** 
 (0.180) (1.489) 
Population (log) 3.135*** 4.189*** 
 (0.983) (0.895) 
Population Density 0.0104 0.0084** 
 (0.0068) (0.0042) 
Personal Income Per Capita 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
 (6.83e-05) (6.75e-05) 
Number of Jobs Per Capita 0.0389 -0.235 
 (0.689) (0.705) 
Black Share of Population 0.126** 0.120*** 
 (0.0502) (0.0429) 
Other Share of Population 0.0762 8.50e-06 
 (0.0599) (0.0559) 
Population Share with Age 0_19 -0.0483 -0.112** 
 (0.0376) (0.0475) 
Population Share with Age 65_more 0.0362 0.0315 
 (0.0472) (0.0463) 
Federal Intgov. Revenue Per Capita -0.0010* -0.0004 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) 
State Intergov. Revenue Per Capita -0.0013** -0.0006 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Functional Breadth of Special Districts 0.269*** 0.295*** 
 (0.0292) (0.0701) 
Citizen Ideology Index 0.0072 0.0154** 
 (0.0081) (0.0072) 
State Government Ideology Index -0.0120*** -0.0127*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0025) 
P-value for Hansen's J  0.4746 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F Stat  111.99 
Results of IVs In The First Stage 
1st IV: Interaction Between 1st Wave of TELs and  
Relative Change of Citizen Conservativeness 
 -0.0032*** 
(0.0002) 
2nd IV: Tension Between Citizen and State Government  -0.0003*** 
  (0.0001) 
Observations 24,285 21,246 
R-squared 0.932 0.09 
County FE & Year FE & Regional Time Trends Yes Yes 
Intergov.Aid & Functional Breadth Lag No Yes 
The dependent variable is the number of special districts per county. Clustered standard errors are in 
parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Chapter 2: 
How Does School District Consolidation Affect Property Values? 
A Case Study of New York1 
2.1 Introduction 
Over the past century, many small school districts that were established as this nation was 
settled have gradually been consolidated, and the number of districts has been cut by almost 90 
percent (National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) 2006, 2011). Despite this dramatic 
change, many states still contain several school districts with enrollment below 500 pupils, 
which are good candidates for consolidation. The principal justification for consolidation is 
economies of scale in the provision of public education, which have been documented by many 
studies (Andrews, Duncombe, and Yinger 2002; Duncombe and Yinger 2007). School district 
consolidation, however, may also have negative impacts on education quality by affecting 
student motivation, parental involvement in schools, or parental access to teachers. Moreover, 
the cost and quality of public schools may influence the attraction of a community to potential 
residents and thereby affect local property values (Nguyen-Hoang and Yinger 2011). This paper 
combines these two issues by examining the impact of consolidation on housing prices, that is, 
by determining whether the market value of single family houses goes up or down when 
consolidation occurs. Building on previous research by Brasington (2004) and Hu and Yinger 
(2008), we examine the impact of recent consolidations on housing prices in New York State. 
An investigation into the property value impact of consolidation provides information 
                                                          
1 This paper was conducted in collaboration with Professors William Duncombe and John Yinger and published in Public Finance 
Review. It is cited in the third chapter as Duncombe et al (2016). 
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about the way home buyers view consolidation and therefore contributes to the debate about state 
policies that affect school district size. Despite extensive consolidation in the past, some states 
still provide incentives to consolidate. Several states, including New York, have aid programs to 
encourage district “reorganization,” which usually means consolidation (NCES 2001). 
Transportation or building aid formulas also encourage consolidation in some cases (Haller and 
Monk 1988). Surprisingly, however, these pro-consolidation policies may be accompanied by 
policies that discourage consolidation, such as operating aid formulas that compensate school 
districts for small enrollment or for small enrollment per square mile (Huang 2004).  
This paper reviews the literature on consolidation, with a focus on the impact of 
consolidation on property values, describes the data and methods we employ, and presents the 
results from our estimation. A final section presents our conclusions. 
2.2 Literature Review 
In principle, consolidation enables school districts to benefit from economies of scale, 
obtain new aid from state government, and provide students with more course options. 
According to the New York State Department of Education (NYSED, 2013), more than 30 
school district consolidations have taken place in New York State since 1980. Regardless of 
potential cost savings, however, school district consolidation is sometimes difficult to achieve. 
Consolidation may increase travel time for students and therefore impose additional 
transportation costs on households (Kenny 1982). Residents may fear a loss of local identity or 
worry that their own community is not compatible with potential partner districts (NYSED 
2013). Moreover, high-income households are less likely to support consolidation, perhaps 
because they place a high value on personal contact with teachers or good access to schools and 
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school activities (Duncombe and Yinger 2007; Hu and Yinger 2008). In addition, students in 
larger school districts may have weaker connections to the school community, a less positive 
attitude toward school, and a lower motivation to learn (Cotton 1996; Barker and Gump 1964; 
Duncombe and Yinger 2007). Finally, consolidation may raise concerns about representation on 
the Board of Education or about whether the new district will operate as expected (NYSED 
2013). These possibilities help to explain why some consolidation propositions failed to pass in 
New York, even when the districts involved are relatively comparable. 
Several scholars have written about the determinants of consolidation (Brasington 1999, 
2003; Gordon and Knight 2006) and about the impacts of consolidation on the cost of education 
(Andrews, Duncombe, and Yinger 2002; Duncombe and Yinger 2007). This literature indicates 
that districts with widely disparate characteristics, such as property values, are unlikely to choose 
to consolidate. Brasington (2003, p. 687) also finds that “greater differences in income and racial 
composition discourage consolidation.”  When two small districts do consolidate, however, they 
are likely to experience some adjustment costs but to save money overall because of economies 
of scale. Duncombe and Yinger find that these economies are considerably smaller in percentage 
terms for two consolidating districts with 1,500 pupils each than for two 500-pupil districts.  
Recent articles by Brasington (2004) and Hu and Yinger (2008) explore the property-
value impact of consolidation. Property value impacts reflect cost savings, but also raise 
additional issues because they may reflect parental concerns that do not appear in school 
districts’ budgets, such as parental access to teachers or the time parents and students spend 
getting to school. Indeed, Brasington finds that once one controls for changes in student test 
scores and property tax rates, consolidation has a negative impact on property values.  
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Hu and Yinger provide an accounting of the channels through which consolidation affects 
house values. The first broad channel reflects changes in the quality of local public services. 
Consolidation leads to increases in state aid to education and, due to economies of scale, it leads 
to a decline in the marginal cost of public services. Both of these impacts give voters an 
incentive to demand higher school quality. The impact of each additional unit of school quality 
on house value is weighted by the difference between the marginal benefits it provides and the 
taxes it requires. The second broad channel reflects changes in the cost of providing existing 
school services. This channel has four parts. First, consolidation may raise the cost of off-budget 
services, such as parental access to teachers or the time it takes students to get to school. Second, 
consolidation may lead to economies of scale, which means that it may result in a lower cost per 
pupil to provide the same level of school services. Third, consolidation may involve adjustment 
costs, such as re-organizing staff or re-designing bus routes. Fourth, consolidation brings in state 
aid. The first and third parts are likely to have a negative impact on house values, whereas the 
second and fourth are likely to have a positive impact.  
The empirical work by Hu and Yinger, which is based on census tracts in New York 
State, finds that the impact of consolidation on house values depends on the enrollment change 
associated with consolidation. As expected from the literature on economies of scale, the 
property value impacts are largest for the smallest consolidating districts, and positive impacts 
fade out once a district size of about 1,000 pupils is reached.  Hu and Yinger also show that all 
the impacts of consolidation on property values are weighted by house value. This theoretical 
prediction is upheld in their empirical work, which finds that consolidation has a strong positive 
impact on house values in census tracts with low average house values and a strong negative 
impact where average house value is high.  
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One final lesson from previous studies is that one must be careful to recognize that 
changes in property values over time may reflect both changes in the value people place on the 
school services they receive in each district and changes in household sorting across school 
districts (Figlio and Lucas 2004, Bogin 2011, Nguyen-Hoang and Yinger 2011). Households that 
strongly prefer the access to teachers they receive in a small district, for example, may leave a 
school district when it consolidates. As a result, changes in house values when a district 
consolidates reflect some combination of changes in the willingness to pay of people with the 
same income and preferences as those originally in the community and changes in the types of 
people who decide to move there. One way to estimate the impact of consolidation on housing 
prices is to use a sample of house sales over time to estimate a hedonic regression with house 
value as the dependent variable and with an indicator variable equal to one in districts where 
consolidation has occurred. The most obvious problem with this approach is that the decision to 
consolidate may be influenced by unobserved factors that also influence house value. Brasington 
(2004) addresses this problem using spatial statistics; Hu and Yinger (2008) use an instrumental 
variables procedure. An alternative approach to this endogeneity problem, which is used in this 
paper, is to focus on the change in price for houses that sell twice. This difference-in-difference 
approach compares the change in housing prices in districts that consolidate between sales to the 
change in housing prices in districts that did not consolidate. As a result, all time-invariant 
factors that influence the decision to consolidate are differenced out. This approach does not 
account for time-varying factors that might influence consolidation, but, as discussed in detail by 
Duncombe and Yinger (2007), consolidation is a long process in New York State and short-run 
changes are unlikely to influence the consolidation decision.  
A limitation of these studies is that the districts that consolidate and the houses they 
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contain may be systematically different from other districts (and their houses). Under these 
circumstances, a comparison of house sales in treatment (i.e. consolidating) and control (non-
consolidating) districts may yield biased results whenever the impact of consolidation depends 
on district or house traits. This problem can be addressed using a propensity score matching 
(PSM) estimator, which accounts for the possibility that the impact of consolidation depends on 
district and house characteristics. With this approach, the first step is to estimate a series of 
propensity score regressions, which predict the probability that a house sale with certain housing 
and district traits will be in a district that consolidates. When combined with a weighting scheme, 
each regression can then be used to select a comparison sample, that is, a set of observations in 
districts that did not consolidate that are otherwise equivalent to the observations in 
consolidating districts. Each comparison sample can then be examined with a series of balancing 
tests to determine whether the distributions of the explanatory variables are similar in 
“treatment” and “comparison” samples. If they are, then the possibility of bias from an 
interaction between “treatment” and explanatory variables is minimal. Details of our differencing 
and matching procedures are presented below. 
2.3 Data and Measures 
The data used in this analysis come from two sources. Property sales information and 
housing characteristics were provided by the New York Office of Real Property Services 
(ORPS) in the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance (NYDTF). Data from 2000 
to 2012 are available in the “Sales” database, which includes 10 years of parcel-level property 
sales information for the state.2  Property transfer reports are filed with the County Clerk and 
                                                          
2 Information on the Sales database is available from NYDTF [Online] 
 http://www.tax.ny.gov/research/property/assess/sales/localoff.htm (acc. December 10, 2013). 
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forwarded to NYDTF. The Sales database includes information on property location, class, sales 
date, and sales price. We include in this analysis only arms-length transactions of 1-to-3 unit 
family homes, constructed for year-round residence with a sales price greater than $10,000. 
Information from the Sales database was merged with the detailed parcel-level data 
included in the Real Property System (RPS) database.  The Real Property System collects 
information from local assessors on a number of parcel characteristics. For this analysis, we use 
information on the characteristics of residential owner-occupied parcels in 2003. We selected 
2003 for two reasons. First, two pairs of districts consolidated in 2004, so this base year gives us 
the pre-treatment information we need to implement PSM. Second, we have complete parcel-
level data for 2003. These data include measures of quality/condition, size, and the availability of 
special features for each house. Quality measures include an assessment of the overall physical 
condition of the residence (including interior and exterior walls, foundation, kitchen, baths, 
heating, plumbing and electrical systems).3  A second quality measure is an assessment of the 
construction grade of the house, which refers to the quality of the material and workmanship 
used to construct the house. Additional variables include the number of square feet of living area 
in a house, the number of bedrooms, and the number of full bathrooms. Special housing features 
in the data set include whether the house has a full basement, central air conditioning, or a 
fireplace. Finally, the data set contains an estimate of the house age at the time of sale.4 
We also collected information about the demographics and socio-economic status of 
residents in the 2000 census tract of each house sale. Specifically, our data set includes measures 
                                                          
3. More information on the house characteristics used in this analysis can be found in the Assessor’s Manual produced by NYDTFe 
[Online]  http://www.tax.ny.gov/research/property/assess/manuals/assersmanual.htm (acc. Dec. 10, 2013). 
4. Information on the RPS data comes from NYDTF [Online]  
http://www.tax.ny.gov/research/property/assess/rps/index.htm (accessed December 10, 2013). 
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of age, race and ethnicity, gender, poverty, income distribution, distribution of house values, 
educational attainment, enrollment in public schools, employment by industry and occupation, 
and unemployment. In short, we have housing sales information from 2000 to April 2012, along 
with housing characteristics data and census-tract information before 2004 when the first 
consolidation in our data set occurred. We merge the three datasets together by assigning house 
characteristics in 2003 and census tract information in 2000 to the dual-sale houses we observe. 
We assume that the houses and neighborhoods in our sample have not experienced much change 
during the sample period—except for, a common time trend and, in some cases, consolidation. 
2.4 Methodology 
Compared with traditional regression analysis, matching methods have two key 
advantages for our study. First, matching methods introduce some of the advantages of a 
randomized experiment into a study based on observational data. Second, matching methods 
reduce the sensitivity of results to model-based and inherently untestable assumptions (Stuart and 
Rubin 2007). Matching methods and regression-based model adjustments are not mutually 
exclusive, however. In fact, many scholars argue that the best approach is often to combine the 
two methods by conducting regression adjustment on balanced samples (Heckman et al. 1997, 
Abadie and Imbens 2006, Ho et al. 2007). The logic behind this combined empirical strategy is 
that the matching methods make it possible to reduce large covariate bias between the treated 
and control groups, and the traditional regression methods can be used to adjust for any residual 
bias and to increase efficiency (Stuart and Rubin 2007). 
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2.4.1  Selection Problems and Sample Selection 
Between 2000 and 2012, three sets of districts consolidated in New York State.5  The 
three sets of districts include Canesteo Central School District (CSD) (921) annexing Greenwood 
CSD (429 students) in 2004, Eastport Unified School District (UFSD) (1,042 students) annexing 
South Manor UFSD (936 students) and Eastport-South Manor Central High School District 
(1,159 students) in 2004, and the North Colonie CSD (5,646 students) annexing the Maplewood 
Common School District (147 students) in 2008. These districts are geographically dispersed 
across the state (Albany County, Steuben County, and Suffolk County). The combined districts 
ranged in size (at the time of consolidation) from 1,250 to 5,793 students.  
For three reasons, the sample of parcels in the consolidating districts included in this 
analysis is not likely to be representative of the rest of the state. First, since relatively few 
districts in New York consolidate, despite generous financial incentives from the state, districts 
that do consolidate are not likely to be typical even of small districts in the state. Brasington 
(1999) found that differences in the student population increased the probability of consolidation, 
while differences in property values per pupil decreased this probability. Gordon and Knight 
(2009) found that increasing heterogeneity in the share of adults with a college degree and in 
district spending are negatively associated with the decision to merge. Second, only a small 
subset of houses experienced two sales from 2000 to 2012, which implies that these houses may 
not be representative of houses in the state. Third, we limit our sample in consolidating districts 
to only those with a sale before and after consolidation. As a result this study should be regarded 
as a case study about the impact on house values of three specific consolidations, not as a study 
                                                          
5. In all three cases one district annexed the other district(s), but voters in all districts approved. For more information on 
consolidation, see the NYSED (2013). 
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about the impact of consolidation in general. 
Another methodological challenge is that districts with certain unobserved housing or 
neighborhood traits may be more likely than others to consolidate. These types of unobservable 
factors might lead to biased estimates of the effects of consolidation on housing prices. To 
address this problem, we use dual sales data to estimate a difference–in-difference regression. 
This approach accounts for time-invariant unobservable factors, but does not rule out the 
possibility of bias from changes in unobserved traits that are correlated with consolidation. 
In addition, we used PSM to select a comparison group that is as similar as possible to the 
treatment group in terms of observable characteristics. Several steps are involved in finding a 
comparison group with PSM.6  First, a set of “confounding” variables need to be identified; these 
variables should be related to both the treatment (the decision to buy/sell a house in a 
consolidating district) and the dependent variable (property value change). We selected a set of 
housing characteristics and neighborhood characteristics that are likely to be related to housing 
prices. These variables include income, property values, racial heterogeneity among enrolled 
students, and parental educational attainment, which have been found to be related to district 
consolidation decisions.7  Model selection was based on both improving the fit of the model and 
finding a sample that meets the common support criteria.8  As part of the process of finding a 
balanced sample, we explored the use of squared and interaction terms. Table 1 describes the 
                                                          
6. For more on PSM see Guo and Fraser (2010), Steiner and Cook (forthcoming), Heinrich, Maffioli and Vazquez (2010), Caliendo 
and Kopeinig (2005), and Becker and Ichino (2002). 
7. We also estimate a propensity score model that includes local revenue effort (= local revenues divided by property value), since 
it may be related to the impacts of consolidation. This approach leads to a sample of 482 observations and to a significant impact 
estimate (-7.25 percent, significant at the 1 percent level), but this sample fails one key balancing test. 
8. See Heinrich, Maffioli and Vazquez (2010) and Caliendo and Kopeinig (2005) for more on strategies for variable selection. 
Models with variables measuring differences between districts and their neighbors in demographics, fiscal capacity, and student 
need explained over 90 percent of the probability that a parcel was in a consolidating district, but led to little overlap in propensity 
scores between treatment and comparison groups. 
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variables used in the final PSM regression model.  
The results of the PSM logistic regression are reported in Table 2. Parcels in 
consolidating districts are more apt to be younger, in bad condition, have a higher grade of 
construction material, larger in terms of square feet and the number of bedrooms and bathrooms 
and to have central air conditioning. These homes are less apt to have a full basement and a 
fireplace, on average. Among census tract variables, the percent of adults with a BA or higher, 
the share of the population less than 20 years-old, and the share of owner occupied houses have a 
nonlinear relationship with the probability of being in a consolidating district (an inverted U-
shape). The child poverty rate and percent of adults in profession or managerial occupations are 
negatively related to consolidation, while the share of low value houses (below $50k) and the 
share of employment in government are negatively related. 
The PSM model was then used to develop propensity scores for a parcel being in a 
consolidating district. We first limit the sample to the area of common support by removing 
observations outside the region where the propensity scores of treatment and control 
observations overlap. This step reduced the number of dual sales by 10 percent in consolidating 
districts and by 5.8 percent in non-consolidating districts.  With this trimmed sample, we 
identified comparison groups using several matching strategies.9  We focus on the results from a 
1-to-1 nearest neighbor match without replacement because best meets on the balancing tests10. 
The matches are limited to a caliper around the propensity score for the treatment group 
                                                          
9. We conduct the matching using the STATA program“psmatch2” developed by Leuven and Sianesi (2003) and explained by Guo 
and Fraser (2010).  
10. We also tried 1-to-1 nearest neighbor matching with replacement, which resulted in a reduction of 40 observations. The new 
sample passed the standardized bias test but not the t-test; results based on it indicate that consolidation, on average, lowered 
housing price by 2.98 percent (significant at 6.3 percent level)—a result that is similar to the one in Table 4. 
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member.11  The result is a sample of 271 treatment and 271 comparison parcels12. Interestingly, 
more than half of the houses in this sample represent repeat sales in the consolidating districts in 
Albany or their matching partners in other areas. The unequal distribution of the sample 
reinforce the conclusion that our study cannot be interpreted as a general treatment of the impact 
of consolidation. We return to this issue when discussing our results. 
The final step in developing a matching sample is checking the balance between the 
treatment and comparison parcels. The simplest approach is to compare mean values for each 
variable in the two groups. If the matched sample is balanced we should not see any statistically 
significant differences in the variables in the propensity score model or in the propensity score. 
As indicated in Table 3, this is the case for this matched sample. It is also important to check 
whether the difference between treatment and comparison group values (bias) is below some 
acceptable level. A simple test is to compare the standardized bias (difference in means divided 
by standard deviation of the respective X variable). One standard that is used is that this bias 
should be below 0.25 (a quarter of a standard deviation).13 As indicated in Table 3, none of the 
confounding variables or the propensity score have a standardized bias above 0.25. So our 
matched sample passed this test, as well14.  
                                                          
11. Guo and Fraser (2010) recommend using a caliper of 0.25 standard deviations for the log of the odds ratio from the logistic 
regression (log(P/(1-P), where P is the propensity score). We set a tougher standard by limiting matches to within 0.15 standard 
deviations. 
12. We deleted a few (13 observations) outliers because they experienced large changes in housing traits. For example, some of 
them installed central air conditioning system during the time between the first sale and the second sale; some expanded the square 
feet of living area; and some “unreasonably “experienced more than a 50 percent price change within one month. 
13. See Ho et al. (2007) and Stuart and Rubin (2008) for a discussion of this approach. Ho et al. (2007) are critical of using 
hypothesis testing to check balance and prefer quantile-quantile (QQ) plots.  This alternative test could be attempted in future 
research. 
14. Another test suggested by Sianesi (2004) and Caliendo and Kopeinig (2005) is to determine whether the pseudo-𝑅2  and 
likelihood ratio chi-square statistic for the propensity score regression are significantly smaller for the matched sample than for the 
sample as a whole. We implemented this test using the Stata “pstest” program of Leuven and Sianesi (2003). Compared to the full 
sample, the pseudo-𝑅2for the matched sample decreases from 0.419 to 0.068 and the likelihood ratio chi-square declines from 
1466.9 to 51 but is still significant. The matched sample also passes this test with 1:5 nearest-neighbor matching and kernel 
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2.4.2  Regression Models 
To estimate the impact of consolidation on housing prices, we must first decide on the 
best way to set the date of a particular consolidation. For most districts, three official dates are 
associated with consolidation: 1) the date of the advisory referendum or filing of petitions; 2) the 
date of the official referendum on reorganization in each consolidating district; and 3) the actual 
date of consolidation.  While advisory votes are common, they do not take place in all cases of 
consolidation and their results are non-binding. Instead, we think that the date of the official 
referendum or the start of the first school year in the consolidated districts are likely to frame the 
time when home owners of the district become aware that reorganization is taking place. 
However, for the three consolidating districts in this paper, we find big time difference between 
these two dates ranging from six to eight months. Due to the time gap, we decided to use the date 
of the official referendum on reorganization as the start of consolidation15.  
With a well matched sample it is possible to determine the average effect of the treatment 
on the treated (ATT) by comparing the means of the treatment and comparison groups. Since our 
impact measure is the change in house sale price before and after consolidation, this would be 
equivalent to a difference-in-difference method (Guo and Fraser 2010; Heinrich, Maffioli, and 
Vazquez, 2010). While this approach has the potential to control for time-invariant unobservable 
differences across treatment and comparison, this comparison has some limitations in our case. 
                                                          
matching but not with Mahalanobis matching. Because these results are ambiguous and this test has no obvious advantages over 
others, we rely on the balancing on the tests presented in the text. 
15. We prefer the date of the official referendum as the consolidation date for two reasons. First, residents are likely to know about 
the reorganization plan by the date of the referendum. Second, if we use the start of the first school year after consolidation, house 
sales during the time gap will become first sales instead of second sales, thereby reducing our sample size and potentially 
introducing measurement error. Nevertheless, changing the start date to the beginning of the first academic year for the 
consolidation (July 1) serves as a robustness check. With this change our sample has 47 fewer observations but the results are 
similar; for example, consolidation decreases housing prices by 3.6 percent, on average (significant at the 4.5 percent level). 
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Under the classic difference-in-difference comparison the treatment is applied at the same time 
to all treatment group members and the pre- and post-observations are made at the same time. 
Neither of these conditions is met in this study. Not all of the districts consolidated at the same 
time and very few of the house sales in our sample occurred on the same day.  
To account for these timing differences, we developed a regression model for the 
matched sample. The dependent variable is the change in the log of house value. We calculated 
the months between the first sale and the starting date in our sample (January 1, 2000), and 
between the second sale and the starting date. One control variable is the difference in months 
between these two measures (D) and a second is the difference in the squares of these two 
measures (
2D ). If t2 represents the time for the second sale, t1 the time for the first sale, and t0 
represents the starting date (January 1, 2000), then these measures can be represented as: 
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         (1) 
The second measure captures not only the time difference between the first and second sales but 
also where these sales fall relative to the beginning of the decade. Given recent changes in the 
housing market, it is important to control for the point in the decade when the sales occur. 
Because the effects of consolidation on property values may take time to emerge, we also 
need to account for where the second sale occurred relative to date of consolidation. We devised 
measures similar to those in Equation (1) to capture the difference in months between the second 
sale and the date of consolidation (M) and the square of this measure (M2). If tc represents the 
date of consolidation, then these measures can be represented as 
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As discussed earlier, Hu and Yinger (2008) found that the impact of consolidation varies 
across districts and census tracts. Specifically, they found that the positive effects of 
consolidation on property values declines with enrollment and that the impact is the highest in 
low-property-value tracts. Given that the North Colonie CSD in Albany has substantially greater 
pre-consolidation enrollment than all other six consolidating school districts, we hypothesize that 
the impact of consolidation on property values is smaller in this district than elsewhere. To test 
this hypothesis, we interact the dichotomous variable for whether the district has consolidated 
(C) with a dummy variable for the large North Colonie CSD (L). We also test the Hu/Yinger 
finding that the property-value impact of consolidation is smaller in wealthier census tracts by 
interacting C with the average income in the census tract (I). In both cases, interactions with M 
and M2 are included in the specification, as well. The two major models for the change in the log 
of property values (DV) can be represented as: 
 
2 2 2
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2 2 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
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DV D D C M M CL ML M L
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   

  

         
        
   (3) 
We also estimate models with both interaction sets to see if these two effects can be separated. 
2.5 Impact Estimates 
Table 4 presents impact estimates with several different specifications. Model 1 just 
includes the consolidation dummy (C) and the measures capturing the months between first and 
second sale (D and
2D ). The coefficient of this dummy is negative and significant at the 9.5 
percent level. It indicates that, on average, consolidation lowers house values by about 2.6 
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percent during our sample period. (The change in the log of house value is approximately equal 
to a percentage change.)  The results for Model 2 indicate that this change is not constant over 
time. Although the coefficients of the two timing variables, M and M2 are not statistically 
significant, their magnitudes suggest that house values decline in the years right after 
consolidation, but then start to increase after about two years and a half. By around five years (61 
months) after consolidation, house values have returned to their initial values and then increase 
beyond that point. These results are illustrated by the solid line in Panel A of Figure 1. 
Model 3 adds interactions between C, D, and D2 and a dummy for the North Colonie 
CSD. 16  Although the first interaction term is only significant at the 9.5 percent level, the other 
two terms (and the three terms taken together) are highly significant. Moreover, the introduction 
of these interaction terms leads to significant coefficients for two of the three original variables 
and for the set (the first three rows). Indeed, as shown by the dotted line in Panel A of Figure 1, 
consolidation has a striking effect on house values in the six districts other than North Colonie. 
The initial impact of consolidation is positive (12.1 percent) but not statistically significant. 
From that point on, however, the pattern in Model 2 arises, but in much stronger form. The 
estimated net effect of consolidation on house values in the six districts equals zero after about 
six months and then becomes negative and significant, reaching -26.8 percent after 31 months. 
At this point the impact turns around, gets back to zero in 57 months, and then becomes positive. 
At the largest post-consolidation time period observed in the data, 65 months, the impact of 
consolidation is positive, as in Hu and Yinger (2008), but this impact, 18.7 percent, is not quite 
significant. In short, consolidation leads to a significant decline in house values for the first 2 ½ 
                                                          
16. A model containing interactions with district enrollment leads to similar results. 
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years, but this decline is then reversed and disappears by 5 years after consolidation takes place. 
We believe that these results probably reflect two effects. First, people may be skeptical 
about consolidation, but then come to appreciate its cost savings and the broader sets of high 
school courses that tend to accompany it. Second, people who dislike consolidation may leave 
consolidating districts and be replaced by people who prefer it or who are willing to pay more to 
get it. We look for signs of sorting in the form of changes in the composition of local residents in 
consolidating districts, but substantial differences in demographic and economic characteristics 
across consolidating and non-consolidating areas have not appeared recently. One plausible 
explanation is that it may take a while for sorting to be noticeable.17  These effects do not arise in 
North Colonie because the consolidation we observe there represents a small change in district 
enrollment and because North Colonie was already so large before consolidation that further cost 
savings from economies of scale probably were not possible.  
Model 4 in Table 4 adds interactions between initial tract average household income and 
the three consolidation variables in Model 2.  Two of these interaction terms (and the three 
together) are statistically significant.  The resulting pattern, illustrated in Panel B of Figure 1, 
shows that the impact of consolidation over time is heavily influenced by tract income. Indeed, 
the solid line in Panel A of Figure 1 is magnified in low-income tracts, moderated in middle-
income tracts, and reversed in high-income tracts. In the case of low-income tracts, the decline in 
house values at 30 months for low-income tracts, -26.9 percent, and the increase in house values 
                                                          
17. We test for sorting by examining whether the composition of residents in consolidating districts has changed, compared with 
both non-consolidating districts during the same time and consolidating districts in earlier periods. We find more adults with a 
bachelor degree or higher, fewer families with income below $20k, a lower poverty rate for persons under 19, and a bigger percent 
of owner-occupied houses in consolidating areas in 2006-2010 American Community Survey (ACS) data than in 2000 census data. 
But significant differences in census traits are not found across consolidating and non-consolidating districts in the 2006-2010 ACS 
dataset. 
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at 65 months, 27.5 percent, are both statistically significant. Moreover, the decline in house 
values at 65 months in high-income tracts, 26.4 percent, is significant, as well. Changes in house 
values over time are not significant in middle-income tracts. 
These income results are consistent with the findings of earlier studies but add a time 
path. As in Hu and Yinger, the ultimate impact of consolidation is to raise house values in low-
income tracts and to lower house values in high-income tracts. We also find, however, that the 
impact of consolidation on house values in low-income tracts is negative at first and only 
becomes positive after about five years. Moreover, the impact in high-income tracts is minimal at 
first but eventually becomes significantly negative. As discussed earlier, these patterns reflect 
some combination of changing views about consolidation as it is experienced and changes in the 
type of households living in consolidated districts. One possibility is that people in low-income 
tracts are particularly skeptical about consolidation at first but then come to appreciate its costs 
savings, whereas high-income people do not expect much from consolidation but eventually 
become discouraged by the loss of contact with teachers or by some other change that 
accompanies it. These finding also could reflect changes in the types of people who move into a 
district once it has consolidated. 
We also estimated models that included interactions with both the dummy for North 
Colonie and initial tract income. Because North Colonie has a relatively high income, however, 
we were unable to separate these two sets of interactions. In other words, none of the interaction 
terms is significant in this specification. Thus, we cannot determine whether our results reflect 
variation in enrollment, variation in initial income, or some combination of the two. Additional 
research with larger data sets is needed to separate the impacts of these two factors.  
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2.6 Robustness Checks 
We also examine the sensitivity of our results to differences in the sample, estimation 
method, and matching algorithm.18,19 Tables 5 and 6 compare estimation results based on our 
main strategy and three alternatives.20 We first check whether the results change significantly if 
we confine the comparison group to the county in which the consolidation occurred or to that 
county’s neighbors. The comparison group for the two consolidated school districts in Albany, 
North Colonie CSD and Maplewood CSD, for example, consists of houses that have sold twice 
between 2000 and 2012 in Albany, Columbia, Greene, Montgomery, Rensselaer, Saratoga, 
Schenectady and Schoharie Counties. By restricting the sample to neighboring regions, we 
eliminate potential biases from unobserved factors that vary across regions of the state.  
 The second alternative is to include propensity scores as weights in a weighted 
regression model (Steiner and Cook forthcoming; Guo and Fraser 2010). The advantage of this 
approach is that we are able to use all treatment and comparison observations in the area of 
common support. The disadvantage is that results can be sensitive to outliers (i.e., propensity 
scores close to zero). Finally, because impact estimates with PSM can also be sensitive to the 
matching algorithm, we also looked at several other matching strategies, and some of them 
                                                          
18. A reviewer suggested that a weighted repeat sales index might be inappropriate when it is based on a small sample size. Given 
that we just have 529 observations in the balanced sample, we conduct a robustness check based on housing price per square foot. 
The average house area is 1669 sq. ft. and school district consolidation decreases housing price per sq. ft. by $1.68 or by $2,803 
(=(1.68)(1669) overall. This is consistent with results based on price alone. 
19. A reviewer also suggested that our results might be biased by the inclusion of real-estate owned (REO) properties and 
foreclosure sales. A decline in price for these houses cannot be simply attributed to a change in the demographics of their 
community or to residents’ perceptions about consolidation.   We find that only 6 houses (1.13% of our sample) are in the category 
“conditional government sale” in which distressed sales are likely to fall. After eliminating these 6 cases, the consolidation 
coefficient becomes -0.029 (p-value = 0.056), suggesting that houses in this category have little impact on our results.  
20. Following Dinardo (2002), we also calculate both average treatment effects (ATE) and average treatment effects on the treated 
(ATT) on the full sample; the estimated effects of consolidation are -4.1 percent and -6.5 percent, respectively. Since this approach 
is sensitive to extreme low or high values of the propensity score (PS), we also estimate our model after deleting observations with 
a PS below 0.1 or above 0.9. The estimated effects are -7.9 percent and -6.5 percent. These results are consistent with those in the 
text, but assume, incorrectly in our case, that all consolidations happen at the same time.  
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passed balancing tests. In the sample selected by 1-to-5 nearest neighbor matching, for example, 
none of the variables is significantly different between the treatment group and control groups. 21  
Panel A of Table 5 indicates that Model 1, with just one consolidation variable, yields 
similar results for all four methods. The range in estimated coefficients is -0.0174 to -0.0342 and 
two of the estimates are significant at the 5 percent level. Panel B makes the same comparisons 
based on Model 4 in Table 4.  The magnitudes and significance of the variables are similar 
across the 4 columns of this panel. 
As a final check, we looked at the distribution of predicted sales prices changes from 
Model 4 using these different methodologies.  As shown in Table 6, the results are quite similar. 
The median predicted house value change, for example, ranges from -2.83 percent (the fourth 
column) to -4.53 percent (the second column).  
2.7 Conclusions 
This paper explores the impact of school district consolidation on house values using a 
sample of house sales in New York State from 2000 to 2012. During this period, three sets of 
districts consolidated. We use propensity score matching to identify house sales that are 
comparable to the sales in these districts and then use double-sales data to compare house value 
changes in consolidating and comparable districts.  
We find that, on average, consolidation has a small negative impact on house values, at 
                                                          
21. The five closest comparison group observations within the caliper (0.15 standard deviations) are matched with each treatment 
group member. The final sample was 764 comparison group members and 271 treatment group members. This matching was done 
with replacement using the “psmatch2” Stata program developed by Leuven and Sianesi (2003). 
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least outside of districts that are relatively large before consolidation. This average impact 
reflects a downward trend in house values right after consolidation combined with a positive 
trend starting two years and a half later. After five years, house values have returned to their pre-
consolidation level and then begin to rise above house values in comparable districts. These 
results suggest it takes a while either for the advantages of consolidation to be apparent or for the 
people who prefer consolidated districts to move in. Finally, the long-run impacts of 
consolidation on house values are positive in low-income tracts, but negative in high-income 
census tracts, where parents may have a relatively large willingness to pay for the access to 
teachers and other non-budgetary advantages of small districts.  
Our results reveal a clear time pattern of consolidation-induced changes in house values. 
This pattern appears to reflect some combination of learning about the consequences of 
consolidation and differences in the preference of households who move into districts before and 
after they consolidate. With the data available to us, however, we cannot test these hypotheses 
about the pattern of house value effects or separate the impact on this pattern of initial district 
enrollment and of initial neighborhood income. These are topics for future research.  
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Table 2.1. Summary Statistics for Sales Price Difference and Variables Used  
in Propensity Score Model 
Variables Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Difference in sales price adjusted for inflation 18960.65 63963.01 -7820259 2858065 
2003 House characteristics:     
Overall condition is good (yes-1) 0.004 0.062 0.000 1.000 
Overall condition is poor (yes-1) 0.105 0.306 0.000 1.000 
Grade A (yes-1) 0.004 0.060 0.000 1.000 
Grade B (yes-1) 0.087 0.281 0.000 1.000 
Full basement (yes-1) 0.727 0.445 0.000 1.000 
Central air conditioning (yes-1) 0.187 0.391 0.000 1.000 
Number of full bathrooms 1.403 0.590 0.000 11.000 
Number of bedrooms 3.035 0.808 0.000 16.000 
No fireplace (yes-1) 0.579 0.494 0.000 1.000 
Age 48.721 36.103 0.000 312.000 
Square feet 1,600.492 603.702 0.000 14,460.0 
2000 Census tract variables:     
Percent of adults with a BA or higher 28.615 14.380 4.600 91.600 
Poverty rate for persons under 19 9.212 8.213 0.000 65.800 
Percent of families with income below $20k 9.960 6.913 0.000 61.300 
Percent of houses with value below $50k 6.224 10.580 0.000 82.500 
Percent owner occupied house 74.745 14.730 3.200 98.300 
Percent of employment in government 6.206 4.047 0.000 26.344 
Percent of professional occupations 38.055 11.046 9.648 75.544 
Percent of population under 20 13.026 2.329 0.100 36.700 
Percent of white in enrolled students 93.132 7.311 15.043 100.000 
Number of observations 64483 
Source: New York State Department of Taxation and Finance, Online Sales Report and Real Property 
System database; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2000 Census of Population and Housing. Data on house 
characteristics from the RPS was available for 2003. 
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Table 2.2. Logistic Regression Results for Propensity Score Model 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Error p-value 
House characteristics:     
Overall condition is good (yes-1) -2.0129 0.4917 0.0000 
Overall condition is poor (yes-1) 0.6523 1.0486 0.5340 
Grade A (yes-1) 0.3793 1.3389 0.7770 
Grade B (yes-1) 0.9324 0.2641 0.0000 
Full basement (yes-1) -0.3046 0.1463 0.0370 
Central air conditioning (yes-1) 0.4895 0.1561 0.0020 
Number of full bathrooms 0.0896 0.1366 0.5120 
Number of bedrooms 0.0875 0.1019 0.3900 
No fireplace (yes-1) 0.4351 0.1505 0.0040 
Age -0.0065 0.0027 0.0160 
Square feet 0.0007 0.0003 0.0170 
Square feet squared 0.0000 0.0000 0.1420 
2000 Census tract variables:     
Percent of adults with a BA or higher 0.7135 0.0498 0.0000 
Percent of adults with a BA or higher 
    squared 
-0.0066 0.0006 0.0000 
Poverty rate for persons under 19 -0.2349 0.0287 0.0000 
Percent of families with income below  
    $20k 
0.0020 0.0305 0.9470 
Percent of houses with value below 
$50k 0.1403 0.0109 0.0000 
Percent owner occupied house 0.3990 0.0581 0.0000 
Percent owner occupied house 
squared -0.0031 0.0004 0.0000 
Percent of employment in government 0.2899 0.0144 0.0000 
Percent professional occupations -0.3091 0.0212 0.0000 
Percent of population under 20 2.5835 0.4417 0.0000 
Percent of population under 20 
squared -0.1220 0.0193 0.0000 
Percent of white in enrolled students -0.0505 0.0216 0.0190 
Constant -31.9117 3.3604 0.0000 
Number of observations 64483 
Pseudo R-squared 0.4373 
Likelihood ratio (chi-square) 1637.75 
Note: Dependent variable is whether district consolidated or not between 2000 and 
2012. 
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Table 2.3. Test for Balance of Sample 1 ( 1-to-1 Nearest Neighbor Match) 
  
  
Full Sample Sample 1 
Mean in Districts 
t-test 
(p-val) 
Standard 
Mean Diff. 
Mean in Districts 
t-test 
(p-val) 
Standard 
Mean Diff. 2003 House characteristics:  Consol. 
No 
Consol. Consol. 
No 
Consol. 
Overall condition good (yes-1) 0.018 0.093 0.000 -0.2580 0.018 0.044 0.085 -0.1486 
Overall condition poor (yes-1) 0.004 0.004 0.953 -0.0036 0.004 0.000 0.318 0.0861 
Grade A (yes-1) 0.004 0.003 0.915 0.0065 0.004 0.000 0.318 0.0861 
Grade B (yes-1) 0.062 0.085 0.167 -0.0834 0.063 0.077 0.502 -0.0578 
Full basement (yes-1) 0.703 0.722 0.471 -0.0435 0.712 0.779 0.076 -0.1529 
Central air conditioning (yes-1) 0.355 0.191 0.000 0.4161 0.362 0.354 0.858 0.0154 
Number of full bathrooms 1.471 1.402 0.052 0.1174 1.480 1.483 0.951 -0.0053 
Number of bedrooms 3.083 3.043 0.393 0.0515 3.092 3.037 0.408 0.0713 
No fireplace (yes-1) 0.601 0.576 0.385 0.0524 0.598 0.550 0.260 0.0971 
Age 43.562 48.173 0.032 -0.1294 43.288 44.487 0.609 -0.0440 
Square feet 1657.300 1600.000 0.113 0.0955 1659.200 1703.300 0.438 -0.0668 
Square feet squared (000) 3200 2900 0.156 0.0856 3200 3300 0.520 -0.0555 
2000 Census tract variables:           
% adults with BA or higher 36.256 28.547 0.000 0.5877 36.646 36.028 0.464 0.0631 
% adults with BA or higher sq. 1412.800 987.060 0.000 0.4767 1434.600 1398.700 0.547 0.0518 
Pov. rate for persons under 19 4.144 8.292 0.000 -0.6239 3.912 4.103 0.653 -0.0387 
% families with income < $20k 6.631 9.314 0.000 -0.4629 6.390 6.300 0.821 0.0195 
% houses with value < $50k 4.557 5.991 0.021 -0.1391 3.743 5.699 0.074 -0.1543 
% owner occupied houses 71.612 75.707 0.000 -0.3202 71.515 72.968 0.201 -0.1102 
% owner occupied houses sq. 5281.200 5895.200 0.000 -0.3389 5269.600 5516.800 0.128 -0.1312 
% of employment in gov’t. 14.934 6.332 0.000 2.1088 15.098 15.834 0.102 -0.1408 
% professional occupations 43.395 38.120 0.000 0.5145 43.668 43.441 0.762 0.0261 
% population under 20 11.468 12.830 0.000 -0.6741 11.435 11.555 0.302 -0.0889 
% population under 20 sq. 133.430 168.680 0.000 -0.6984 132.630 135.300 0.324 -0.0850 
% white in enrolled students 92.245 93.858 0.000 -0.2918 92.124 92.426 0.358 -0.0791 
Propensity Score 0.164 0.004 0.000 5.9403 0.1667 0.16727 0.9600 -0.0043 
Number of observations 276 57768     271 271     
Note: The full sample was limited to the area of common support before the matching was done.  Sample 1 is based on 1:1 nearest neighbor 
matching within a caliper set at 0.15 standard deviation of the log of the odds ratio.  Sampling is done without replacement. 
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Table 2.4. Regression for Percent Change in Sales Price after Consolidation 
(Based on Comparison Group Selected with a 1-to-1 Nearest Neighbor Match) 
Policy-related Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3* Model 4** 
Consolidation -0.0256 0.0049 0.1209 -0.0106 
 (0.095) (0.875) (0.152) (0.704) 
Months since consolidation  -0.0028 -0.0249 -0.0011 
  (0.359) (0.003) (0.627) 
Months since consolidation squared  4.59E-05 0.0004 5.49E-06 
  (0.465) (0.003) (0.895) 
 
Large school district-consolidation interaction -0.1464  
   (0.095)  
Large school district-months since consolidation interaction 0.0265  
   (0.002)  
Large school district-months since consolidation interaction sq. -0.0004  
   (0.002)  
 
Income-consolidation interaction    -0.1378 
    (0.236) 
Income-months since consolidation interaction  0.0254 
    (0.013) 
Income-months since consolidation interaction squared  -0.0005 
    (0.004) 
R-squared 0.4318 0.4333 0.4586 0.4489 
Note:  Dependent variable is change in log of sales price. Sample size is 529. Estimated with OLS 
regression with robust standard errors.  Significance levels are in parentheses.  All regression 
models include as control variables the propensity score, the difference in months between first 
and second sale and the difference in months between first and second sales squared. 
*The large school district indicates the North Colonie CSD in Albany which has 5,464 students 
before consolidation, much larger than 772 students, the average pre-consolidation enrollment 
level of all other school districts in our sample. The coefficients of three interaction terms for that 
large school district are -0.0256, 0.0016 and -0.0000, respectively; none of them is significant.  
** The income variable is de-meaned in order to make the results of Model 4 comparable to those 
of other models. 
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Table 2.5. Estimated Impacts of Consolidation on Sales Prices with Different Methodologies 
  
1:1 NN  
Matching 
1:1 NN Matching 
(Neighboring 
Counties) 
Propensity Score 
Weighted 
Regression on Full 
Sample 
1:5 NN  
Matching 
Panel A: Model 1 
Policy-related 
Variables Model 1 Model 1 Model 1 Model 1 
Consolidation 
dummy variable  
-0.0256 -0.0342 -0.0300 -0.0174 
(0.095) (0.025) (0.022) (0.193) 
R-squared 0.4318 0.4622 0.3075 0.3503 
Panel B: Model 4 
Policy-related 
Variables Model 4 Model 4 Model 4 Model 4 
Consolidation 
dummy variable 
-0.0106 -0.0192 -0.0065 0.0034 
 (0.704) (0.488) (0.839) (0.905) 
Months since 
consolidation 
-0.0011 -0.0007 -0.0021 -0.0023 
 (0.627) (0.757) (0.404) (0.309) 
Months since 
consolidation 
squared 
5.49E-06 -5.05E-06 2.10E-05 3.14E-05 
(0.895) (0.903) (0.627) (0.444) 
Income-
consolidation 
interaction 
-0.1378 -0.1485 -0.2017 -0.1566 
(0.236) (0.204) (0.100) (0.163) 
Income-months 
since consolidation 
interaction 
0.0254 0.0257 0.0284 0.0283 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.004) (0.003) 
Income-months 
since consolidation 
interaction squared 
-0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0006 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
R-squared 0.4489 0.4817 0.3255 0.3637 
Note: Significance levels are in parentheses. NN stands for “nearest neighbor.” 
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Table 2.6. Distribution of Predicted Change in Sales Price after Consolidation 
(Results for Model 4 with a Different Sample, Weighting Method and Matching Algorithm ) 
 
1:1 NN  
Matching 
1:1 NN Matching 
(Neighboring 
Counties) 
Propensity Score 
Weighted 
Regression on Full 
Sample 
1:5 NN  
Matching 
Distribution Model 4 Model 4 Model 4 Model 4 
Mean -3.11% -4.18% -3.80% -2.04% 
     
5th -7.34% -8.82% -9.67% -6.91% 
     
10th -6.40% -7.85% -7.52% -5.40% 
     
25th -5.12% -6.28% -5.83% -4.28% 
     
Median -3.53% -4.53% -4.08% -2.83% 
     
75th -1.92% -2.82% -2.65% -1.17% 
     
90th 1.35% 0.16% -0.83% -2.94% 
     
95th 3.73% 2.39% 1.78% 6.32% 
Note: Predicted percent change in the sales price between the second and first sale in 
consolidating districts minus what it would predicted without consolidation. This accounts for 
time between the second sale and date of consolidation. 
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Figure 2.1. Change in Property Values After Consolidation 
 
Panel A: By School District Size 
 
Panel B: By Census Tract Income (Adjusted Model 4) 
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Chapter 3: 
How Does the Change of Local Government Structure Affect Property Values?  
A Case Study of Village Dissolution in Upstate New York 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the federal system of the U.S., villages and townships typically embody the spirit of local 
autonomy as they are small enough for people to know each other, to easily assemble to debate 
and to conveniently exercise democracy. However, streams of institutional, economic and fiscal 
factors recently have been converging together and substantially changing the landscape of local 
government in the U.S., including New York (NY) State. First and foremost, a locality’s 
municipal designation has many implications for governance, service provision and inter-
governmental aid. But most of the cities, towns and villages were established prior to 1920 in 
NY State; since then many changes have taken place in the social-cultural environment, 
transportation, demographics and economy that encourage local residents to find more efficient 
ways of public service provision1. In particular, the financial crisis of 2008 and its aftermath have 
imposed a variety of fiscal pressures on NY local governments (i.e. counties, cities, towns and 
villages), including “declining or static tax base, stagnant level of state aid, escalating healthcare 
and employee benefit costs, the lack of mandate relief and the need to support new security 
measures”2. In addition, complicated fiscal relations continue to be a source of contention 
between towns and villages in NY. According to Local Government Handbook of NY State 
(2009), village residents are liable for payment of taxes to the village in which they reside, as 
                                                          
1 More discussion on the outdated municipal class system in NY State can be found in Outdated Municipal Structures: Cities, 
Towns and Villages-18th Century Designations for 21st Century Communities, Alan G. Hevesi, Office of The New York State 
Comptroller. http://www.yurgartis.net/munistructures.pdf 
2 Office of New York State Comptroller. Intermunicipal Cooperation and Consolidation  
 http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/pubs/research/cooperation1.pdf  
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well as to the town where their villages are located. When residents are taxed for town services 
they do not receive or when they do not want to pay the village governments for local services, 
they begin to doubt the legitimacy of overlapping tax systems and the corresponding government 
structure. For example, in many towns, village residents are required by town boards to bear the 
costs of town highway equipment and snow removal on town roads, although the State Highway 
Law exempts them from paying the cost of repair and improvement of town highways. Many 
village residents are not satisfied with the duplicative fiscal burdens on their shoulders. 
Moreover, the redundant and fragmented property tax assessing system may also disappoint 
residents in villages. According to the NY State Department of Taxation and Finance3, there are 
1,116 property tax assessing units in NY, including 2 counties, 61 cities, 920 towns and 133 
villages. Moreover, village assessors are probably duplicative; village residents receive two 
different assessments for taxes levied by different units of government4 (Yinger 2012).  As a 
result, outdated municipal class designation, contentious inter-governmental fiscal relationship, 
increasing budget constraints and fragmented property tax assessing system force local 
governing bodies and residents to rethink the existing mode of governance and to seek new ways 
of delivering service. Apart from restructuring, privatization, government entrepreneurship, and 
some other strategies recommended by experts and professionals, consolidation-an old and new 
approach-has increasingly drawn public attention nowadays.  
The principal argument in favor of consolidation or dissolution is economies of scale, through 
which production cost is expected to decrease holding service quality constant. However, 
centralizing local autonomy by eliminating “redundant” layers of government goes directly 
                                                          
3 http://www.tax.ny.gov/pit/property/assess/reform/index.htm 
4 Four Flaws in New York State’s Property Taxes and How to Fix Them: Small Assessment Units (Yinger 2012) 
 http://cpr.maxwell.syr.edu/efap/about_efap/ie/Aug12.pdf  
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against the traditional wisdom of the Decentralization Theorem. This theorem, formalized by 
Oates, states that decentralization will increase economic efficiency because local provision of 
public service is usually tailored to the demand of residents in respective jurisdictions, resulting 
in higher levels of social welfare than central determination of uniform levels of outputs across 
jurisdictions (Oates 1972; 1993)5. The trade-off between harvesting producer efficiency through 
centralization and enhancing consumer efficiency through decentralization naturally leads to a 
basic concern that, for dissolved villages in NY State, whether they have obtained “net” 
efficiency gains after dissolution6, or put it differently, whether they have reduced public service 
cost without sacrificing service quality. 
This paper is the first study to provide an overall evaluation of village dissolution by exploring 
how much home buyers value dissolution as measured by how much they are willing to pay to 
live in a village that has recently dissolved. It is noteworthy that the focus of this study is not to 
estimate the average price changes of all sold and unsold houses caused by village dissolution7, 
but to look for a sign whether people care about dissolution by only analyzing property sales 
data. In this narrow sense, using changes of sold-property values to assess the overall impact of 
village dissolution is reasonably appealing, as sold-property values comprehensively, although 
indirectly, capture the impact of any improvements affected by village dissolution. In addition, as 
the responsibility of providing public service to former village areas will be assumed by town 
                                                          
5 Both Oates (1972) and Besley & Coate (2003) argue that, for heterogeneous districts, decentralization is welfare superior to 
centralization in the absence of spillovers, although they differ in justification and implications of centralization. 
6 Many village residents may deny dissolution decision because they do not believe the town is able to maintain the same level of 
public service quality in the village areas after dissolution, while some other residents may approve dissolution either because they 
believe they will receive the same public service or because they prefer financial bonus brought by productive efficiency. One 
example exhibiting the tension between these two attitudes is 
http://blog.syracuse.com/opinion/2013/05/votes_have_consequences_and_ea.html#incart_river. 
7 Actually, like many studies on capitalization topics in Urban Economics, it is also very hard to precisely capture the average 
impact on people’s willingness to pay in a dissolved village, owing to the potential differences of property owners between sold 
houses and unsold houses, and the lack of information about unsold-house prices and corresponding owners. 
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governments, this paper also investigates whether the change of village government structure has 
impact on the local housing market in the town outside village (TOV) areas. In the next session, I 
will briefly discuss the concept of village dissolution and how it is relevant to property values in 
Upstate NY, and then review literature in Section III, which is followed by an analysis of 
methodological challenges and data issues in Section IV. The paper ends with discussions of 
empirical results and policy recommendations. 
3.2 Village Dissolution and Its Impacts on Housing Prices in New York 
Per the definition given by New York State Department of State, Consolidation of Village means 
“either (a) the combination of two or more local government entities resulting in the termination 
of the existence of each of the entities to be consolidated and the creation of a new entity which 
assumes jurisdiction over all of the terminated entities, or (b) the combination of two or more 
local government entities resulting in the termination of the existence of all but one of the entities 
which shall absorb the terminated entity or entities.” Dissolution of Village is defined as “a 
process whereby a village ceases to exist as a governmental entity.” It is noteworthy that the 
process of village dissolution “does not require the consent of the town in which the village is 
located.”8 More often than not, both dissolution and consolidation are put under the same 
conceptual umbrella of consolidation as village dissolution can also be interpreted as a process 
that a village consolidates with the town where the village is located. Nevertheless, this paper 
notes subtle differences between the two terms and only picks up cases of village dissolution in 
upstate NY. 
                                                          
8 The New York Government Reorganization and Citizen Empowerment Act, Effective March 21, 2010. 
  http://www.dos.ny.gov/lg/publications/ConsolidationDissolutionLaw.pdf  
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In NY State, the necessity of village dissolution has been seriously recognized and substantially 
encouraged by NY State Department of State (DSD), which provides both financial and technical 
support to help local governments to shrink government size. There are at least two explicit types 
of grants from the DSD in NY, one is competitive Local Government Efficiency Grant (LGEG), 
and the other one is noncompetitive The Local Government Citizens Reorganization 
Empowerment Grant (LGCREG). In the past a couple of years, around 50 villages and towns 
have applied for LGEG to study possible consolidation of public service with other jurisdictions 
or dissolution of their village governments.9 From 2000 to date, 12 villages have successfully 
approved their dissolution plans and they are scattered among 10 counties in upstate NY 10 (see 
Table-1 and Figure-1), though at least 24 villages voted against dissolution after 200811.  
In NY State, a village can be either formed or dissolved at the full discretion of local residents. 
Since villages are usually formed within towns, the underlying towns would become fully 
responsible for governing the territory of the former village after dissolution. The dissolution 
process can be initiated either by the village board of trustees on its own motion or through an 
appropriate voter petition to the board of trustees. In either case, the dissolution decision should 
be finally determined by the voters of the village at an election. Also, in either case, the village 
board of trustees is responsible for formulating a dissolution plan, which must address several 
important issues, including: (1), the disposition of the property of the village; (2), the payment of 
outstanding obligations and the levy and collections of the necessary taxes and assessments; (3), 
the transfer or elimination of public employees; (4), the continuation of village functions or 
                                                          
9 Here is the website of Local Government Efficiency Grant http://www.dos.ny.gov/lg/lge/projects.html#GovConsDiss 
10 http://www.dos.ny.gov/lg/village-inc-diss.html  
11 I’m trying to build a comprehensive inventory of villages which failed to dissolve after 2000. The current 24 fail-to-dissolve 
villages all held their voting after 2008. More data before 2008 will soon be collected. 
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services by the town; (5), a fiscal analysis of the effect of dissolution on the village and the area 
of the town or towns outside the village, and any other matters which are necessary to carry out 
dissolution12. The village board of trustees must appoint a study committee to prepare a report on 
the village dissolution plan and the committee must hold at least one public hearing upon 20 
days’ notice published in the official village and town newspapers. In addition, the village board 
of trustees must also hold at least one public hearing, after which a dissolution proposition will 
be presented to the village voters at the next regular or special village election of officers held 
not less than 30 days after the board of trustees hearing. The proposition is used to educate and 
inform the resident village electors as to the consequence of their vote. If the proposition is 
approved by a majority of those voting on the question, the village would then be dissolved as of 
the thirty-first day of December in the year following the year in which the election took place. 13 
Based on dissolution study plans published by both successfully-dissolved and non-successfully-
dissolved villages, many village taxpayers in NY believe village taxes are too high, especially in 
conjunction with county, town and school taxes. By dissolving village governments, village 
residents are able to cancel at least some administrative cost of village governments through 
eliminating administrative positions like village mayor, village court, clerks and corresponding 
salaries and benefits, and possibly shift part of their service cost to other town residents in TOV 
areas. So, logically, the primary benefits of village dissolution for former village residents is 
lower property tax burden. For example, the dissolution study plan by the Village of Seneca Falls 
                                                          
12 The difference between board-initiated process and the voter-initiated procedure lies in that the later one requires an initial public 
referendum prior to development of a dissolution plan under the Article 17-A of the General Municipal Law. If the initial 
referendum passes, the village will then be required to draft a formal plan and the drafted plan can either automatically take effect 
upon approval of the village board, or subsequently determined by a permissive referendum. A similar discussion can be found in 
http://www.empirecenter.org/publications/streamline-options-for-localities/.  
13 Local Government Handbook, 2009 http://www.dos.ny.gov/lg/publications/Local_Government_Handbook.pdf 
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(2009) claimed that dissolution will decrease property tax by approximately 48%14. The literature 
on property tax capitalization clearly demonstrates that lower property taxes, to some degree, 
increase property values, so it is reasonable to believe dissolution will be strongly associated 
with the increase of housing prices15. Practically, however, the degree to which residents’ fiscal 
burden will be really reduced depends on the specific institutional tools that surrounding towns 
use to continue public service provision to the former village areas. If surrounding towns simply 
spread the former village cost to all town citizens, village residents will benefit more than if 
surrounding towns carefully use special districts to maintain public service in former village 
areas because special districts will still confine the public service costs within former village 
areas. In addition to property tax relief, dissolution may increase efficiencies in town 
management and town-wide resource distribution. Also, eliminating an invisible boundary that 
divides the townwide community may help economic development and engage more village 
residents in town affairs. 
Despite above-mentioned merits, village dissolution may also bring potential detriments to 
village residents and their property values. If a village dissolves, it would no longer be a separate 
corporate entity. As described earlier, most of villages were established before 1920s and losing 
their status represent a significant change to the culture of the community. For many village 
residents, especially for property owners, the loss of identity means not only culture changes, but 
also loss of policy agenda control. Also, it is full of uncertainties about whether the future public 
service quality will remain the same in terms of sufficient code enforcement, sidewalk snow 
plowing, brush pickup, and the like. Nobody can guarantee that townwide representation will 
                                                          
14 https://www.dos.ny.gov/lg/publications/LGEProjectReports/2008/SenecaFallsDissPlan.pdf  
15 Technically, of course, property tax savings for village property owners will not be realized until implementation. 
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effectively account for the interests of village residents who formed and maintained village 
governments in order to effectively obtain special services and easily access policemen, fire 
fighters and social workers. Many residents may think the projected property tax savings are not 
a fair compensation for the great uncertainty and potential loss that dissolution will bring. Under 
this circumstance, property values may decrease, even though some village residents are very 
active in voting for dissolution. 
More interestingly, because village residents are the only electorate who have voting rights to 
make a dissolution decision, it is highly possible that village dissolution imposes an exogenous 
shock to TOV residents and their properties. The decision-making process of village dissolution 
implicitly determines that dissolution may be used by village residents to shift some village 
wide-service costs to other town residents living outside of village areas. Although town officers 
are usually engaged in developing dissolution plan and special districts are often used to 
maintain fire/streetlight service quality in former village areas, as acknowledged in many 
dissolution study plans, some costs shifts are unavoidable even if policy makers endeavor to 
minimize this cost-shifting impact. Indeed, as mathematical calculation in many village 
dissolution study plan demonstrates, property tax burdens usually decrease in potentially 
dissolved-village areas, but increase in TOV areas. The unique decision-making process and 
substantial difference in property tax burden impacts of dissolution between village and TOV 
areas, imply that both the estimation strategy and analytical results of housing price impacts of 
village dissolution will be different, which will be described and analyzed in Section IV. 
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3.3 Literature Review 
Whether village dissolution will be captured by the change in local housing market is a 
capitalization research topic. Following Oates (1969), scholars have extensively explored 
capitalization issues in local public finance. According to subjects which have been studied to be 
capitalized into property values, literature on capitalization can be roughly classified into three 
streams of thoughts. The first strand of literature focuses on how property tax is capitalized into 
housing price (Oates 1969; Yinger et al 1988). The second category studies the extent to which 
the quality of public service and environmental amenities are capitalized into property values and 
specific topics range from crime rate, water quality (Leggett & Bockstael 20000), proximity to 
open space (Anderson & West 2006), access to public parks (Lall & Lundberg 2007) to quality 
of education (Ross & Yinger 1999; Nguyen-Hoang & Yinger 2011). These two streams of 
research confirm the existence of capitalization and are helpful in revealing the composition of 
housing price in particular regions. The current study belongs to the third stream of capitalization 
research which aims to unveil the mystery of the impacts of changing government structure on 
housing market from a political-economy perspective. I will go through the literature in the third 
stream and discuss how those previous studies differ from this paper, as below. 
Different local government structures imply different governance channels through which the 
governed are managed, public affairs are handled and public interests are secured in particular 
jurisdictions. So, logically, changing government structures will affect residents’ perception of 
tax burden, mode of service delivery, control of local agenda and their own interests and thereby 
is related with housing demand. Most of existing research on capitalization of government 
structure concentrates on special-purpose governments in the federal context of the U.S. 
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Since 1980, more than 30 pairs of school districts choose to consolidate to save costs in NY 
State. Regarding the property-value impacts of school district consolidation, Brasington (2004) 
finds that once one control for changes in student test scores and property tax rates, consolidation 
has a negative impact on property values in urban school districts. It is noteworthy that the 
estimate cannot be interpreted as a comprehensive evaluation of the value that presents place on 
all aspects of consolidation, as the service –tax package is controlled. In fact, what he estimates 
is how much people are willing to pay for consolidation-induced factors that fall outside the 
school district budget.  
By using first differencing and 2SLS strategy to deal with endogeneity problems, Hu and Yinger 
(2008) identify several causal channels including economics of population scale, state aid, tax 
share, budgetary and non-budgetary factors affecting  school quality, adjustment cost and 
consolidation-induced changes in tax shares, and propose that consolidation, on average, has a 
positive effect on housing values in rural school districts, but such an effect is moderated by 
enrollment size and income groups. Specifically, the property value impacts are largest for the 
smallest consolidating districts, and positive impacts fade out once a district size of about 1,000 
pupils is reached. They also find consolidation has a strong positive impact on house values in 
census tracts with low average house values and a strong negative impact where average house 
value is high. In addition, they demonstrate that state aid accompanying consolidation generates 
approximately one third of the impact of consolidation on house values in small districts. 
Although they do not test the impact of each causal channel, their specification of causal 
mechanism illustrates that property value impacts of consolidation are driven by factors that are 
linked to both productive efficiency and allocative efficiency.  
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Duncombe et al. (2016) use double sales data in the housing market in upstate NY State and 
adopt propensity score matching to get rid of selection bias.  They find that, except in one large 
school district, consolidation has a small negative impact on house values. But this average 
impact reflects a downward trend in house value during the years right after consolidation 
combined with a positive trend subsequently. In addition, the long-run impacts of consolidation 
on house values are negative in high-income census tracts. In short, findings on the capitalization 
of school district consolidation are basically consistent with literature in economies of scale; 
moreover, both Hu & Yinger (2008) and Duncombe et al. (2016) emphasize the importance of 
two moderators in the causal path diagrams: one is enrollment size and the other one is income 
level. 
In addition to school district, there are many other types of special-purpose governments in the 
U.S., such as fire-service districts, water districts, and library districts. Because many special-
purpose governments also have power to tax, collect user charges and fees, and deliver public 
service, the existence of them may affect people’s decision on house purchase. Billings and 
Thibodeau (2010) use data in Denver Metropolitan area to test whether decentralizing public 
goods providers affects residential property appreciation rates. Their empirical findings show 
that institutional decentralization has no influence on single-family property appreciation rates. 
Specifically, although residential property values for homes located in jurisdictions that added 
security special districts16 experienced rates of appreciation, recreation, fire, water, sewer and 
other special districts had no measurable influence on appreciation rates. In addition, their results 
indicate that more overlap among local governments reduces appreciation rates. 
                                                          
16  Security districts provide service such as security gate, security guard, neighborhood watch, lighting and so forth. 
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To sum up, previous research carefully treats methodological challenges and reaches 
illuminating findings on the capitalization of special-purpose governments. Special-purpose 
governments, however, are quite different from general-purpose governments primarily in that 
the latter provide a bundle of public service instead of a single type of service. The mix of public 
service provision compound difficulties in controlling for public service efficiency when 
estimating cost function, implying that it is not feasible to directly apply cost function to specify 
impacts of economies of scale at village level as what Duncombe &Yinger (2007) and Hu & 
Yinger (2008) do at census tract level. In addition, changes in households across village-
township boundaries and tax price suggest difficulties in accurately calculating consumer surplus 
changes which are crucial to estimate changes in allocative efficiency caused by dissolution. 
Besides, the total outlay of special-purpose governments (except school district) is not 
comparable to that of general-purpose governments. Many special districts are even not well 
perceived by local residents as they are too small and nearly voluntary-based. So, it is entirely 
possible that empirical findings and theoretical predictions based on special-purpose 
governments are not applicable to general-purpose governments. Thus, it is important to collect 
empirical evidence on whether and how village dissolution is capitalized into residential property 
values.  
3.4 Methodological Challenges and Possible Solutions 
This section first discusses key methodological challenges, and then analyzes and compares 
possible identification strategies to estimate housing price impacts of village dissolution in 
former village areas, based on both methodological legitimacy of each approach and practical 
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quality of housing sales data. After that, it will briefly describe empirical strategies for estimating 
how village dissolution affect housing price in TOV areas. 
In non-experimental or observational studies, as exemplified by the village dissolution case in 
this paper, the houses and corresponding villages between dissolved villages and non-dissolved 
villages are likely to be different in both observed and unobserved ways.  The first 
methodological challenge is that a simple comparison of house sales in dissolved villages and 
non-dissolved villages may yield bias whenever the housing price impacts of dissolution depends 
on observable village or housing traits. For instance, population trends and property tax burdens 
assumed by village residents may be quite different across villages and they probably influence 
both housing purchase and village dissolution decisions, as described in many village dissolution 
study plans. Under these circumstances, covariate bias or sample imbalance should be minimized 
in order to make house sales comparable between dissolved villages and non-dissolved villages.  
The second challenge is that village dissolution decision may be influenced by some unobserved 
factors which also affect house values. As previously described, in any village dissolution 
election, a dissolution proposition is required to inform citizens of the consequences of 
government reorganization in terms of possible changes in public service quality, property tax 
burden, public employee positions, disposition of village assets and liabilities, and the payment 
of outstanding obligations. So, when residents forecast that village dissolution will (or will not) 
achieve substantial production cost savings or that the additional gains in producer efficiency 
will (or will not) substantially exceed the additional loss in consumer efficiency, they will vote 
for or against dissolution decisions. In either case, dissolution decisions are determined by 
village residents’ perception of the history, the status quo, and the future trade-off between 
public service quality and production cost in their communities. These decisions are also 
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determined by the relationship between their towns and their villages. All these concerns 
logically and invisibly influence both village dissolution decisions and local real estate market 
but are hard to explicitly control for in empirical models. So, a comparison between two study 
groups is susceptible to an omitted variable bias. Last but not least, most village dissolution 
referendums were held during or after the 2008 financial crisis. Consequently, the unstable 
underlying trends in housing market further complicates the estimation. It is noteworthy that it 
usually took a couple of years from dissolution petition/imitation to final dissolution vote, hence, 
random shocks or short-run changes (i.e. heavy snowstorm in a village in a particular year) 
would not be expected to drive or dominate the final voting results on village dissolution. 
In evaluating housing impacts of educational services and programs, a couple of methods have 
been raised to deal with the covariate bias and omitted variable bias in the existing literature. 
When representative and sufficient straddling repeat sales17 are available, an ideal approach is to 
combine propensity score matching (PSM) with difference-in-difference (D-D) to make an 
estimation. PSM, unlike regression, does not try to model the relationship between the X’s and 
outcome but attempts to model the association between X’s and treatment status in order to avoid 
using outcome data at the stage of sample selection. It replicates the spirit of randomization by 
creating balanced groups which look only randomly different from one another on the basis of 
observed variables (Stuart & Rubin 2007; Stuart 2011). The key idea is treatment group and 
control group are comparable only when the distributions of covariates are very similar between 
two groups18. As the second step, after obtaining a balanced sample in which each house has been 
                                                          
17  Straddling repeat sales are those repeat sales for which the first sale occur before treatment and the second sale occur after 
treatment. 
18 A series of balance test (e.g. simple T-test, standardized bias test and so on) should be adopted and passed before one claim to 
obtain a balanced sample.  
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sold twice (or more), one can estimate a regression with price change of each house as the 
dependent variable and with an indicator equal to one in villages where dissolution has occurred. 
The setup of this regression functions like a D-D approach and controls for all time-invariant 
factors that influence both the house value and dissolution decision19. Again, the validity of this 
methodology depends on whether two conditions can be satisfied. First, whether one can obtain 
sufficient straddling repeat sales in both treatment group and control group before matching20. 
Second, whether the housing and neighboring characteristics of repeat sales are representative of 
those of all housing sales21. In this paper, it is obvious that I will not have a sufficient amount of 
straddling repeat house sales in treatment group for matching as housing market in rural areas are 
not so active as that in urban areas. Therefore, it is predictable that a large sample of straddling 
repeat sales will not be easily established.22 
Although it is not feasible to adopt the above mentioned optimal identification strategy, a repeat 
sales sample, when coupled with hedonic model, parcel-level fixed effects and village-level time 
trends, is still very helpful in estimating impacts of dissolution on housing price in former village 
areas and TOV areas in the past 15 years in upstate NY.23 Conceptually, treatment group 
observations include all repeat housing transactions in dissolved villages24 from 2000 to 2014; 
while the counterfactual group involves all repeat housing transactions in comparable villages in 
                                                          
19 Time-varying factors could be controlled for by adding a series of timing difference variables into regression on the basis of a 
balanced sample. More details can be found in Duncombe et al (forthcoming). 
20 When adopting PSM, both the step of limiting sample to a common-support area and the procedure of matching will substantially 
filter and reduce the size of repeat sales. So, the original size of repeat sales should be large enough. 
21 The external validity of research findings will be threatened without a set of representative repeat sales. That is why both 
Duncombe et al (2016) and this paper acknowledge the limitation of their sample and claim their research as case studies. 
22It is expected that this approach will be more appropriate after updating the housing sales data next year. 
23 Similar identification strategies (i.e. combine repeat sales with a series of fixed effects) have been used in estimating housing 
price impacts of educational reform or school report cards. See Il Hwan Chung, William Duncombe & John Yinger (2013 under 
review), and Figlio & Lucas (2004). 
24 12 dissolved villages include village of Andes (2003), village of Pike (2009), village of Limestone (2010), village of East 
Randolph (2011), village of  Randolph (2011), village of Perrysburg (2011), village of Seneca Falls (2011), village of Edwards 
(2012) and village of Altmar (2013). 
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the same time period in the upstate NY25. By comparable group, this papers means villages in the 
same geographic divisions within NY State. Specifically, NY City, NYC northern suburbs, 
Nassau-Suffolk areas, Buffalo Region, Mid-Hudson Region, and Upper Hudson Region will be 
excluded as no village dissolution took place in those areas in the past 30 years and these areas 
present significantly different economic features from the remaining regions in upstate NY. In 
other words, only repeat house sales from regions 2,3,4,6 will be included in my research, as 
indicated in Figure-2. 
Consider the following hedonic model, with log of housing price as the dependent variable and 
parcel as the unit of analysis (subscript i, n, v and t mean parcel, census tract, village and year, 
respectively),  
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑃)𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑡 =  𝛼𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑡 + 𝛽𝑁𝑛𝑣𝑡 + 𝛾𝑉𝑡𝑣 + 𝛿𝑉 ∗ (𝑡 − 𝑡0) + 𝜃𝑅𝑡 + 𝜌𝑅𝑡 ∗ (𝑡2 − 𝑡
∗) +  𝜇𝑖 +  𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑣                    
(Equation 1) 
Let X stand for individual housing characteristics, N include neighborhood and social-
demographic variables26, V mean villages characteristics, 𝑉 ∗ (t − 𝑡0)  stand for village-specific 
time trends with 𝑡0 equal the starting date of my sample, 𝑅𝑡 be a binary indicator that equals 1 in 
a dissolved village after dissolution date and 0 otherwise. Suppose dissolution occurs in year 𝑡∗, 
(𝑡2-𝑡
∗) captures the timing difference between dissolution date and second-sale date. Moreover, 
let 𝜇𝑖 stand for parcel-level time-invariant heterogeneity, and 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑣 be an error term.  
                                                          
25 As mentioned earlier, there are 11 villages that tried but failed to dissolve their villages during the same time period. These 
villages are expected to be more comparable with dissolved villages than other villages who never consider the necessity of 
dissolution. This provides another opportunity for robustness check. 
26 As demonstrated in Yinger (2014), Ns should take quadratic forms based on constant elasticity demand functions for public 
services and housing. For simplicity, Ns shows up in linear form in Equation 1. 
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The key methodological challenges of estimating the above hedonic model include, a) it is hard 
to get sufficient, time-varying and/or time-invariant Xs, Ns and Vs, and b) the existence of 
unobserved heterogeneity will bias my estimation. However, repeat sales enable me to exploit 
parcel-level within variations by using fixed effects approach and other tactics to handle those 
challenges.  
First, to avoid the possibility that dissolved villages and non-dissolved villages have 
systematically different unobserved heterogeneities that also affect housing prices, this paper 
adopts parcel-specific fixed effects. By doing so, all time-invariant omitted variables, whether at 
parcel level, census tract level or village level, will be fixed out from my model. Moreover, by 
getting rid of all  houses which have experienced significant changes in inventory, condition, 
fire, an addition to properties, and all other substantial physical changes over time,  my 
estimation could be largely protected against bias from time-varying parcel-level characteristics. 
Second, because some neighborhood and village factors may affect both property values and 
village dissolution over time, because my sample period partially coincides with the Great 
Recession, and because dissolution events did not occur at the same time, it is necessary to 
account for changing macro-economic and social factors by controlling for village-specific time 
trends. The parcel-specific fixed effects and village-specific time trends together are supposed to 
account for all unobservable factors that vary linearly over time and therefore eliminate 
possibility of bias from these factors, even if they are strongly correlated with the treatment 
events, i.e. village dissolution27.  
                                                          
27 Bloom (1984) provides an example involving both fixed effects and time trends. 
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The above methods, however, fail to protect estimation against possible bias caused by 
unobserved factors that influence both housing prices and village dissolution decisions and that 
vary in a nonlinear way over time. Fortunately, as I explained earlier, the existing laws on local 
government reorganization basically guarantee that village residents could be intensively 
involved in the long dissolution debate and process so that random shocks or short-run changes 
are not able to drive the final voting results on village dissolution in NY. Procedurally, 
dissolution plans and public hearing are mandatory; institutionally, permissive referendums give 
residents second chance to change the initial voting results under the Article 17-A of the General 
Municipal Law; and economically and politically, rural areas are relatively stable in NY. 
Third, the possibility that the effects of dissolution on property values may take time to emerge 
or that the impact is not constant over time, requires to account for when the post-dissolution sale 
occur relative to voting date of dissolution.  By controlling for the time length between those two 
points in time, this paper is also able to analyze the possible time pattern of the housing price 
impacts of village dissolution. 
Fourth, when setting the exact date of a particular dissolution event, I prefer the date of 
referendum to the effective date, because village residents could be immediately aware that 
dissolution is taking place on voting date28. Another motivation to do so is that many effective 
dates of dissolution events are so close to the end of my sample period that I would lose many 
post-treatment observations if I employ the effective date as the dissolution date. The choice of 
using voting date as the treatment date implies that, my estimation results will comprehensively 
                                                          
28 It is rare that permissive referendum change the initial voting results, so I use initial voting date as the dissolution date for those 
successfully dissolved villages. 
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pick up non-budgetary effects of dissolution on housing prices between voting date and the 
effective date of dissolution.29. 
In short, this analysis builds on a comparison between repeat housing sales in dissolved villages 
and those in non-dissolved villages, uses parcel-specific fixed effect and village-specific time 
trends to deal with heterogeneity and endogeneity issues, and controls for timing difference 
between the second sale and the voting date of dissolution.  By designing so, 𝑅𝑡 enables to 
capture the shift in intercept while [𝑅𝑡 ∗ (𝑡2 − 𝑡
∗)] capture the shift in post-dissolution time trend 
caused by village dissolution. This equation can also be directly applied to estimate housing 
price impacts of dissolution in TOV areas. The application of this model to TOV areas make 
perfect sense as village dissolution can reasonably be treated as an exogenous shock to residents 
and their properties in TOV areas, as explained earlier. 
3.5 Data  
Property sales information and housing characteristics were provided by the New York Office of 
Real Property Services (ORPS), which has recently been merged into the New York State 
Department of Taxation and Finance.  Property sales data from 2000 to 2014 are available in the 
“Sales” database, which includes 15 years of parcel-level property sales information for the state. 
The Sales database includes information on property location, class, sales date, and sales price. 
This analysis only includes arms-length transactions of single family homes, which are 
constructed for year-round residence with a sales price greater than $10,000 and which have not 
                                                          
29 When accumulating more data in future, I would like to use the effective date of a dissolution to see how my estimation results 
would be changed and thereby study time line effect, namely focusing on how reactions to village dissolution change over time. 
Different reactions at different points in time may point us to one policy implication that when policy makers should compensate 
people. But, so far, I do not have many observations during post-effective-date period, and this interesting topic will be explored 
in future. One example with focus on the time line effect is “House Price during a Siting Stages: The Case of an Incinerator from 
Rumor through Operation” (Kiel and McClain 1995). 
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experienced significant changes in physical conditions between the taxable status date and  the 
sale date.  The Real Property System also collects information from local assessors on a number 
of parcel characteristics.  Quality measures include an assessment of the overall physical 
condition of the residence (including interior and exterior walls, foundation, kitchen, baths, 
heating, plumbing and electrical systems).  A second quality measure is an assessment of the 
construction grade of the house, which refers to the quality of the material and workmanship 
used to construct the house.  Additional variables include the number of square feet of living area 
in a house, the number of bedrooms, and the number of full bathrooms.  Special housing features 
in the data set include whether the house has a full basement, central air conditioning, or a 
fireplace.  Finally, the data set contains an estimate of the house age at the time of sale.   
This paper will also use information about the demographics and socio-economic status of 
residents in the 2000 census tract in the section of robustness check. Specifically, the data set 
includes measures of age, race and ethnicity, gender, poverty, income distribution, distribution of 
house values, educational attainment, enrollment in public schools, employment by industry and 
occupation, and unemployment. In the section of robustness check, the selection of 
neighborhood amenity variables and model specification issues will be further discussed.  
3.6 Empirical Results 
As I explained earlier, the effects of village dissolution on housing prices in village areas could 
be positive or negative, conditional on many institutional, cultural, financial and historical 
factors. Based on Equation 1, the first column in Table-2 captures possible intercept shift in 
property values caused by dissolution events, while the second column shows us whether the 
property value effects of dissolution will change during the post-treatment period. Interestingly, 
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the empirical results did not find any significant shift in either intercept or post-treatment time 
trends in village areas. One possible, abstract, explanation is that the potential benefits of 
economies of size are offset by loss of allocative efficiency (e.g. loss of power in local agenda 
setting, easy access to local police, etc.) Another, more practical, explanation is that the specific 
institutions through which public services responsibilities are assumed by town governments 
may prevent financial costs of within-village public service from spreading to surrounding TOV 
residents. Since special districts are widely designed and used to replace the former village 
governments in providing fire, police, and sewer and water services, the existing housing 
demand curve will not substantially change. Actually, it is not common for town governments to 
unconditionally accommodate village service into their current system in upstate NY, meaning 
that financial costs of former village residents are not very likely to decrease, and thereby 
bidding and sorting functions will not be substantially affected30. 
Based on the same models, columns 3 and 4 reveal different stories in the TOV areas. First, 
dissolution decline property values by almost 16% in the TOV areas, and the declining effects 
become stronger as time goes by31.The magnitude of the negative effect is very large considering 
the relatively stable economic environment in upstate NY. One possible reason for the negative 
effects is that TOV residents are usually not engaged in the village dissolution debate but they 
perceive to unfairly shoulder additional financial cost previously assumed by village residents32. 
The contrasting empirical effects of dissolution on housing prices between former village areas 
                                                          
30 It is noteworthy that this paper is not designed to differentiate bidding and sorting effects of village dissolution.  
31 Due to a relatively small amount of repeat sales in my treatment group, it is not quite meaningful, either logically or statistically, 
to further explore non-linear patterns of post-treatment time trends. 
32 See “Surrounding Towns Not Happy with Village of Medina Dissolution Plan” 
 http://www.twcnews.com/archives/nys/rochester/2014/04/18/surrounding-towns-not-happy-with-village-of-medina-dissolution-
plan-NY_725160.old.html  
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and the TOV areas, demonstrate that TOV residents believe it is not fair to be excluded from 
village dissolution, and they should be effectively involved into policy-making process.  
Although the combination of repeat sales, parcel-specific fixed effects and village-specific time 
trends could significantly improve internal validity of my estimation, it is not helpful in 
enhancing external validity of my empirical results. Specifically, neither straddling repeat sales 
nor non-straddling repeat sales could be simply treated as representative of single sales, and 
therefore, my results cannot be generalized without caution.  
3.7 Robustness Checks 
My previous estimation results are completely based upon all repeat sales in similar regions 
within upstate NY. In this section, I will check whether my results are robust against a different 
sample selection and the inclusion of single sales. 
First, as described earlier, twenty-four villages initiated dissolution process but finally failed to 
pass the voting referendum after 2008. It is therefore interesting for both state policy makers and 
those willing-to-dissolve villages to understand how property values are affected by dissolution 
decision between successfully-dissolved villages/TOVs and unsuccessfully-dissolved 
villages/TOVs. So, my first sensitivity analysis is to confine my control group to repeat sales in 
villages where residents voted against dissolution and then make an estimation. Not surprisingly, 
the magnitudes and the significance levels of both dissolution and post-dissolution time trends 
are quite consistent with my previous results. Dissolution do not have any real and significant 
effects on housing prices within villages; while it does negatively affect real estate market in 
corresponding TOVs.  
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Second, the relatively small sample size of treatment group33, and potentially unobserved 
difference between houses which have been sold at least twice and those which have been sold 
only once(Clapp et al 1991), present big challenges to the external validity of my previous 
estimation results. So, I should check the sensitivity of my results to the inclusion of single sales.  
The previous way to estimate Equation 1, however, cannot be directly applied to a full sample 
with both repeat sales and single sales included. First, it is not appropriate to employ parcel-level 
fixed effects when single sales are included; second, without parcel-level fixed effects, I have to 
seek methods to deal with the existence of Xs, Ns, and Vs; third, the presence of Xs, Ns and Vs 
immediately lead to concerns about model specification issues. Fortunately, the existence of 
housing characteristics, neighborhood amenities and village factors and the concerns about 
model specification can be dealt with by direct control methods, village-level fixed effects, 
village-specific time trend, and referring to previous discussions on hedonic model specifications 
(Yinger 2015). Consider the following hedonic model, which is the same with Equation 1 except 
the new term, 𝜑𝑣, the village-specific fixed effects, 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑃)𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑡 =  𝛼𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑡 + 𝛽𝑁𝑛𝑣𝑡 + 𝛾𝑉𝑡𝑣 + 𝛿𝑉 ∗ (𝑡 − 𝑡0) + 𝜃𝑅𝑡 + 𝜌𝑅𝑡 ∗ (𝑡2 − 𝑡
∗) +  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜑𝑣 +  𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑣          
(Equation 2) 
Specifically, house age, area, house construction grade, quality measures of basement, central air 
conditioning, number of bathrooms and bedrooms, fireplaces are all explicitly controlled for as 
Xs. At the neighborhood level, I use Geo-coding techniques in GIS to find the matched census 
tract where a house is located and then attach the census tract information to that house. After 
merging the 2000 census tract data with the property sales data, I can directly control for the 
                                                          
33 Deng et al (2011) argue that research methods based on repeat sales may face a large reduction in sample size. 
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following variables at census tract level (i.e. Ns) in my estimation: percent of adults with a 
bachelor degree or higher, percent of families with income below $20 thousands, percent of 
properties with values below $50 thousands, percent of properties with values more than $ 300 
thousands, percent of owner occupied house, poverty rate, percent of people with professional 
occupations, percent of employment in government, percent of unemployment, percent of 
population older than 65 years old, percent of population under 20, percent of white people and 
so on. Village-specific fixed effects (𝜑𝑣) and time trends (δV ∗ (t − t0)) will be jointly used to 
control for time-invariant and time-varying village-level features which influence both 
dissolution decisions and property values. Again, the sample exclude all houses experiencing 
significant changes to physical conditions. Moreover, drawing on the existing research results 
that quadratic case respond to the assumption that the price elasticity of demand for public 
services is infinite and that a linear specification for the hedonic is inconsistent with the standard 
sorting theorem (Yinger 2015), my model adopts quadratic forms for Ns. Hopefully, we control 
for sufficient Xs and Ns so that we do not need to worry about the presence of μi. 
To make the results of two datasets comparable, all model specifications follow Equation 2 in 
Table-4. Then, any difference in estimation results between full sample and repeat sales sample 
will be simply attributed to sample distinction rather than difference in model specifications. 
Table-4 demonstrate that the results based on full sample are partially consistent with those 
based on repeat sales sample, especially when it comes to the declining post-dissolution time 
trends in TOV areas. The main inconsistent finding is that, statistically, full sample supports a 
significant declining post-treatment trend.  The magnitude, 0.5%, however, is not quite 
significant in economic sense. 
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The two robustness check basically provide consistent evidence with my main findings that 
village dissolutions, although do not significantly affect house prices in former village areas, do 
impose negative influences on property values in TOV areas where residents are very upset with 
negative externalities, i.e., possible increase of financial burdens brought by village dissolutions.  
3.8 Discussion 
The background for this study is provided by a broad concern among practitioners with 
improving the design of revenue assignment and expenditure assignment, especially when local 
governments face tight budget constraints, in the context of American fiscal federalism.  In 
addition, whether government reorganization has economic impacts is a very important academic 
topic both in political economy and in local public finance. This paper is the first study focusing 
on whether village dissolution, as a form of general-purpose government structural change, will 
affect the attractiveness of local communities. Towards that end, a repeat sales sample, coupled 
with parcel-level fixed effects and village-specific time trends, is built to estimate whether local 
housing demand has been affected by village dissolution, both in former village areas and TOV 
areas. 
Basically, dissolution events do not bother housing prices in former village areas, probably due 
to the institutional design of using special districts to replace former village governments in 
providing basic public service in NY State. However, TOV residents do not feel fair to assume 
externalities of a possible increase of financial burdens caused by local government 
reorganization. Because they are not really engaged in the decision-making process, the decline 
of housing demand reflects their attitudes towards possible negative spillover effects of village 
dissolution. Even worse, the decrease of property values may backfire in future, as town 
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governments will continue to face a shrinking property tax base. So, an important policy 
implication of this research is, even though TOV residents are not geographically affected by 
dissolution, it is important to take account of their benefits and interests in policy design.  
Future research agenda includes, a) collecting more political and fiscal information on the 
operation of special districts which have been used in eliminated village areas, b) estimating net 
cost of village dissolution in NY, and c) comparing public service cost under different 
institutions, namely whether special districts are more efficient in providing fire service, water 
service, and police service than village governments. 
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Figure3.1.  
Geographical Distribution of Village Dissolution History in Upstate NY (2000-Present) 
 
 
Note: Four villages passed the voting for dissolution in Cattaraugus County. In addition, the 
dissolved Keeseville was a village in Clinton and Essex Counties. 
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Figure3.2.  
Geographical Regions within New York State 
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Table 3.1. New York State Village Dissolution between 2000 and 2014 
Village Name Town Name County Name Date of 
Referendum  
Effective Date of 
Dissolution 
Village of Andes Town of Andes Delaware County 2002, June 3 2003, December 31 
Village of Pike Town of Pike Wyoming County 2008, March 18 2009, December 31 
Village of Limestone Town of Carrollton Cattaraugus County 2009, September 
28 
2010, December 31 
Village of Randolph Town of Randolph Cattaraugus County 2010, March 16 2011, December 31 
Village of East Randolph Town of Randolph &  
Town of Conewango 
Cattaraugus County 2010, March 16 2011, December 31  
Village of Seneca Falls Town of Seneca Falls Seneca County 2010, March 16 2011, December 31 
Village of Perrysburg Town of Perrysburg Cattaraugus County 2010, March 16 2011, December 31 
Village of Edwards Town of Edwards St.Lawrence 
County 
2011, March 15 2012, December 31 
Village of Altmar Town of Albion Oswego County 2011, December 6 2013, May 1 
Village of Keeseville Town of Ausable &  
Town of Chesterfield 
Clinton County &  
Essex County 
2013, October 22 2014, December31 
Village of Bridgewater Town of Bridgewater Oneida County 2014, March 18 2014, December31 
Village of Lyons Town of Lyons Wayne County 2014, March 18 2015, December31 
Main Data Source: Village Dissolutions since 1900 in NY State 
http://www.dos.ny.gov/lg/village-inc-diss.html   
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Table 3.2. The Effects of Village Dissolution on Property Values in Upstate NY, 2000-2014 
(Models are based on Equation 1)* 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Village 
Model 1 
Village 
Model 2 
TOV 
Model 1 
TOV 
Model 2 
     
Dissolution -0.0382 0.0547 -0.159* 0.0525 
 (0.121) (0.0733) (0.0853) (0.148) 
     
Months Since Dissolve  -0.00662  -0.0115** 
  (0.00542)  (0.00555) 
     
Constant 11.16*** 11.16*** 11.53*** 11.53*** 
 (0.000414) (0.000362) (0.000151) (0.000174) 
     
R-squared 0.911 0.911 0.936 0.936 
Parcel-Level FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Village-Specific Time Trends Yes Yes   
Town-Specific Time Trends   Yes Yes 
Observations** 18,612 18,612 41,272 41,272 
     
Note: The dependent variable is housing price in log form. As explained in text, the variable “month since dissolve” 
equals the time length between the date of dissolution and the date of second sale. Clustered standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
*Model 1s capture the shift in intercept, and Model 2s additionally capture shifts in post-dissolution time trends. 
**There are 268 observations in finally dissolved villages (Village Model 1 and Model 2) and 260 observations in 
corresponding TOV areas (TOV Model 1 and Model 2).   
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Table 3.3. The Effects of Village Dissolution on Property Values in Upstate NY, 2000-2014 
Robustness Check: Comparison with Unsuccessfully-Dissolved Villages/TOVs  
 (Models are based on Equation 1)* 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Village 
Model 1 
Village 
Model 2 
TOV 
Model 1 
TOV 
Model 2 
     
Dissolution -0.0382 0.0547 -0.182** 0.0248 
 (0.123) (0.0742) (0.0863) (0.128) 
Month Since Dissolve  -0.00662  -0.0121** 
  (0.00549)  (0.00588) 
Constant 11.04*** 11.04*** 11.54*** 11.54*** 
 (0.00318) (0.00278) (0.000428) (0.000478) 
     
R-squared 0.893 0.894 0.937 0.937 
Parcel-Level FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Village-Specific Time Trends Yes Yes   
Town-Specific Time Trends   Yes Yes 
Observations 2,456 2,456 14,272 14,272 
     
Note: The dependent variable is housing price in log form. As explained in text, the variable “month since dissolve” 
equals the time length between the date of dissolution and the date of second sale. Clustered standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
*Model 1s capture the shift in intercept, and Model 2s additionally capture shifts in post-dissolution time trends. 
**There are 268 observations in finally dissolved villages (Village Model 1 and Model 2) and 260 observations in 
corresponding TOV areas (TOV Model 1 and Model 2).   
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Table 3.4. The Effects of Village Dissolution on Property Values in Upstate NY, 2000-2014 
Robustness Check: Comparison between a Repeat Sales Sample and a Full Sample  
 (All Models Are Based on Equation 2)* 
 Full Sample*** Repeat Sales Sample**** 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Village 
Model 1 
Village 
Model 2 
TOV 
Model 1 
TOV 
Model 2 
Village 
Model 1 
Village 
Model 2 
TOV 
Model 1 
TOV 
Model 2 
         
Dissolution -0.0268 0.0372 -0.0524 0.0964 -0.0890 -0.134 -0.0362 0.233*** 
 (0.0471) (0.0577) (0.0743) (0.0937) (0.0603) (0.107) (0.0603) (0.0853) 
Month Since Dissolve  -0.00570***  -0.00880***  0.00336  -0.0145** 
  (0.00149)  (0.00270)  (0.00394)  (0.00677) 
Constant 11.03*** 11.02*** 12.18*** 12.18*** 13.48*** 13.48*** 11.41*** 11.41*** 
 (1.185) (1.185) (0.733) (0.733) (1.508) (1.508) (0.986) (0.986) 
         
R-squared 0.625 0.625 0.627 0.627 0.655 0.655 0.666 0.666 
Direct Control** Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Village FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes   
Village-Specific Time Trends Yes Yes   Yes Yes   
Town FE   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Town-Specific Time Trends   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Observations 48,352 48,352 108,784 108,784 18,608 18,608 41,268 41,268 
         
Note: The dependent variable is housing price in log form. As explained in text, the variable “month since dissolve” 
equals the time length between the date of dissolution and the date of second sale. My full sample only picks up 
house sales from regions 2,3,4,6 in Figure-2 as well. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
*Model 1s capture the shift in intercept, and Model 2s additionally capture shifts in post-dissolution time trends. 
**There are 10 housing-characteristic variables and 13 neighborhood-feature variables directly controlled in all 
models. 
***When using a full sample (Column 1-4), there are 1,015 observations in finally dissolved villages (Village 
Model 1 and Model 2) and 800 observations in corresponding TOV areas (TOV Model 1 and Model 2).  
****4 observations are lost due to the missing values of control variables when I estimate Equation 2 on the basis of 
repeat sales sample (Column 5-8).  
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